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A B ST R ACT. The Supreme Court often confronts the choice between bright-line rules and
open-ended standards- a point well understood by commentators and the Court itself. Less well
understood is a related choice that arises once the Court has opted for a standard over a rule:
may lower courts develop subsidiary rules to facilitate their own application of the Supreme
Court's standard, or must they always apply that standard in its pure, un-"rulified" form? In
several cases, spanning a range of legal contexts, the Court has endorsed the latter option, forti-
fying its first-order standards with second-order "rules against rulification."
Rules against rulification are a curious breed: they promote the use of standards, but only
in a categorical, rule-like manner. The existing literature on the rules-standards dilemma sheds
only limited light on the special problems that anti-rulification rules present. This Article ad-
dresses these problems head-on, disentangling the sometimes-unintuitive consequences that fol-
low from the Court's adoption of anti-rulification rules, while also offering practical insights as
to when and how these rules should be deployed. Among other things, the Article points out that
anti-rulification rules, while useful in some circumstances, can carry the surprisingly maximalist
consequences of freezing the development of the law and constraining the methodological choic-
es of lower court actors. In addition, the Article sets forth some prescriptive suggestions regard-
ing the creation and detection of anti-rulification rules, proposing, for instance, that the Court
should proceed cautiously before pronouncing rules against rulification and that lower courts
should insist on express prohibitions from the Court before deeming themselves barred from the
rulification endeavor.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court often faces a choice between bright-line rules and
open-ended standards. That is, with what degree of specificity should the
Court enunciate controlling principles of doctrine? The tradeoffs are familiar.
With rules, the Court can buy itself uniformity, predictability, and low decision
costs, at the expense of rigidity, inflexibility, and arbitrary-seeming outcomes.
With standards, it can buy itself nuance, flexibility, and case-specific delibera-
tion, at the expense of uncertainty, variability, and high decision costs.' Most
cases that reach the Court's docket present some version of this design dilem-
ma, and virtually every opinion that the Court issues reflects some determina-
tion as to where on the rule/standard spectrum its holding ought to lie.
The choice between rules and standards sometimes gives rise to a second
choice, which materializes once the Court has opted for a standard over a rule.
Having articulated a governing standard, should the Court permit future rule-
like elaborations on the substance of the standard, or should it require that
lower courts apply the standard in its pure, un-"rulified" form? Put differently,
the Court must choose between adopting a permissive standard, whose applica-
tion may be assisted by the development of ancillary rules, or a mandatory
standard, whose content is fortified against future doctrinal development by a
rule against rulification.
Florida v. Harris illustrates this choice.2 The case involved the Florida Su-
preme Court's application of the Fourth Amendment probable cause test,3
which, as defined by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, permits searches
based on "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place."4 The Florida court in Harris had held that a police
dog's detection of drug odors did not create probable cause to search the de-
fendant's vehicle, reasoning that the dog lacked the requisite credentials to in-
dicate a "fair probability" of contraband under Gates.' In so holding, the Flori-
da court identified several criteria for evaluating the drug detection credentials
of canine cops: among other things, the government bore the burden of adduc-
1. See infra note 19.
2. 133 S. Ct. 1O (2013).
3. Id. at 1053.
4. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Rather than tethering probable cause to the presence of precise,
outcome-determinative criteria, the Court in Gates endorsed a "totality-of-the-
circumstances" inquiry, governed by a "practical, common-sense decision whether... there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place." Id.
S. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1055.
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ing "the dog's training and certification records, an explanation of the meaning
of the particular training and certification, field performance records (including
any unverified alerts), and evidence concerning the experience and training of
the officer handling the dog."6 Applying this highly specific minimum-
showing requirement, the state court went on to hold that the police lacked
probable cause to conduct the search.7
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The lower court had erred, the
Court explained, by "creat[ing] a strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item
the State must tick off."8 In this way, the state court had employed the "antith-
esis of a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis," as it had not allowed eviden-
tiary deficiencies as to a dog's training credentials to "be compensated for...
by a strong showing as to ...other indicia of reliability."9 The "inflexible
checklist," simply put, was not "the way to prove reliability.""0 The state court
should have asked the simpler question of whether "all the facts surrounding a
dog's alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasona-
bly prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of
a crime.""
The Supreme Court's disapproval of the lower court's decision encom-
passed not just a substantive disagreement with the conclusion that the police
lacked probable cause, but also a methodological objection to the manner in
which the court had performed its analysis. The state court had applied a rule
where a standard was required. Gates demanded a particularized, case-by-case
inquiry into each individual canine-based search; it did not permit the promul-
gation of an across-the-board, outcome-determinative "checklist" approach for
evaluating the drug detection credentials of police dogs. Harris may thus be
construed as embracing an anti-rulification rule, making clear that the Gates
standard was mandatory rather than permissive as applied to sniff-search
probable cause review. Lower courts may not, according to this rule, attempt to
objectify the standard's operation across broad categories of future sniff-search
cases. Rather, they must take care to preserve the standard in its present-day,
un-rulified form.12
6. Harris v. State, 71 So. 3 d 756, 775 (Fla. 2011).
7. Id. at 775.
8. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056.
9. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 233).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1O58.
12. A terminological point: unless otherwise stated, my use of the term "lower courts" is intend-
ed to encompass all courts that rank below the Supreme Court of the United States with re-
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Rules against rulification are a curious breed. In one sense, they further
many of the benefits associated with standards writ large. They guard against
over-inclusive and under-inclusive doctrinal formulations and promote fairness
on an individualized basis. They reduce the risk of legal obsolescence over time.
They encourage the case-specific deliberation long associated with the common
law method. At the same time, rules against rulification are themselves rules -
rules that limit lower court involvement in the implementation of Supreme
Court doctrine. When the Supreme Court promulgates a permissive standard,
lower courts may (or may not) choose to fill in the relevant gaps with bright-
line boundaries, safe harbor presumptions, categorical exceptions, multi-factor
tests, and the like. 3 When, in contrast, a rule against rulification makes a
standard mandatory rather than permissive, lower courts may do nothing more
than apply that standard in a holistic and case-specific fashion, one that leaves
no room for further specifying what the standard itself requires.
The primary goal of this Article is to sketch out some criteria for evaluating
the use of rules against rulification and, accordingly, the choice between man-
datory and permissive standards. Having decided to offer the lower courts
guidance by means of a standard rather than a rule, when should the Court
take the further step of expressly prohibiting the lower courts from rulifying
the standard in future cases? At first glance, this question might seem to an-
swer itself: if the Supreme Court has opted for a standard over a rule, why
would it ever wish for the lower courts to translate the standard into rules? In
fact, however, good reasons will often favor that result. Invoking considera-
tions related to doctrinal uncertainty, decisional experimentation, and geo-
graphic uniformity, among others, the Article will demonstrate that the Court
might sometimes sensibly choose to adopt a standard on the one hand, while
permitting its rulification on the other.
By introducing the concept of anti-rulification rules and offering a prelimi-
nary appraisal of their advantages and disadvantages, this Article aims to con-
tribute to at least three ongoing areas of scholarly inquiry. The first involves
the rules-standards problem itself. Beginning at least with the legal realists, 4
spect to judgments of federal law, including, but not limited to, state supreme courts, state
appellate courts, U.S. circuit courts, and U.S. district courts.
13. The mechanics of this process (sometimes termed the "rulification of standards") are further
described in Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803 (2005). See infra Part I.B (describing the process in greater de-
tail).
14. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 115-20 (1922); see
also Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American
Property Law, 94 CoRNFLL L. REv. 959, 977 (2009) ("Some of the early realists realized that
rules and standards served different functions.").
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courts and commentators have scrutinized many aspects of the choice between
rules and standards, focusing on their respective virtues and vices, their effects
on individual conduct, their relationship to formalist and functionalist modes
of judging, and so on."5 While not intervening directly in the longstanding
rules-standards debate, this Article does shine new light on the issue by sug-
gesting how choices between rules and standards at the Supreme Court level
can end up affecting the development of law at the lower court level. Among
other things, for instance, the Article suggests that when standards are permis-
sive rather than mandatory, proponents of rules should sometimes be willing
to tolerate the adoption of such standards by the Supreme Court itself, on the
theory that permissive standards still leave room for lower courts to clear up
uncertainties in the doctrine with rules of their own creation. Put another way,
a standard adopted by the Supreme Court need not translate into totality of the
circumstances review in every lower court case. Moreover, the articulation of a
standard by the Supreme Court- if permissive rather than mandatory- may
facilitate the Court's own fashioning of rules in a future set of cases.
The second area of relevant literature involves judicial minimalism. A min-
imalist court, as Cass Sunstein has put it, "settles the case before it, but...
leaves many things undecided," avoiding in the meantime "clear rules and final
resolutions" regarding issues that might benefit from further contemplation
among courts, other public officials, and private citizens.' 6 For this reason,
Sunstein and other commentators have drawn parallels between the debate
over minimalism versus maximalism and the debate over rules versus stand-
ards. Compared to standards, rules more severely constrain the resolution of
future cases; consequently, minimalists champion standards over rules in
enunciating controlling propositions of law. 7 This Article, however, offers an
important caveat regarding this jurisprudential stance. I suggest that standards
more comfortably jibe with minimalism when articulated in a way that permits
the development of follow-on rules. The Court does not necessarily further
minimalist values when it foists a legal standard on all future courts for all
time, categorically prohibiting these courts from developing rules to assist in
the application of the standard. Rather, the more minimalist court merely
adopts a standard for itself, leaving future courts free to decide whether the
standard performs best in rulified, semi-rulified, or non-rulified form. From a
law-development perspective, that is, the minimalist virtues of standards will
tend to dissipate when rules against rulification enter the picture: it is with
iS. See infra note 19.
16. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT ix
(1999).
17. See infra Part III.F.
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permissive standards, but not mandatory standards, that the Court can effec-
tively "leave things undecided."
Finally, in describing and examining the Court's existing rules against ruli-
fication, I hope to contribute to an emerging area of scholarly interest and de-
bate: the role of the Supreme Court in shaping and constraining the methodo-
logical choices of the courts it oversees. The academic literature on this
question has focused primarily on issues of statutory interpretation, inquiring
into the possibility, reality, and desirability of according binding effect to vari-
ous methods by which courts glean meaning from statutory texts. Scholars in
this line of work have asked, for instance, whether the Court should require fu-
ture interpreters of a statute to employ textualism over purposivism, prohibit
lower courts' reliance on legislative history, or otherwise constrain the methods
by which judges discern the meaning of statutory commands., 8 While this Ar-
ticle does not specifically engage with these questions, it may offer a new per-
spective on the problem, by drawing attention to a set of doctrines through
which the Court has unabashedly imposed methodological restraints on its
subordinates. The Court's rules against rulification, that is, may help us under-
stand the relationship between methodology and precedent more generally. At
the least, they raise the question whether the Court's current willingness to
impose methodological constraints on lower courts' application of precedential
standards can be reconciled with its current unwillingness to do the same when
it comes to the interpretation of statutory texts.
The ensuing analysis proceeds in five Parts. Part I offers a conceptual over-
view of anti-rulification rules, explaining what they are and how they operate.
Part II catalogues examples of anti-rulification rules in several different areas of
Supreme Court doctrine. In doctrinal domains ranging from the Fourth
Amendment to the Takings Clause to intellectual property law to the law of
remedies, the Court has established limitations on the extent to which lower
courts may rulify substantive standards that the Court itself has laid down.
With these examples on the table, Part III turns to the consequences of rules
against rulification, focusing on the various ways in which they influence the
application and development of the Supreme Court's doctrinal commands.
Among other things, the analysis suggests that rules against rulification tend to
reduce the extent of over- and under-inclusiveness problems within a given ar-
ea of law, while also helping to promote the appearance (though not necessari-
ly the reality) of uniformity across the various sub-jurisdictions that the Su-
preme Court oversees. Rules against rulification also tend to enhance the
decisional autonomy of trial courts, while correspondingly reducing the super-
visory powers of their intermediate-level counterparts. And rules against rulifi-
18. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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cation tend to restrict the extent to which lower courts may experiment with
doctrine and, by extension, the extent to which the Supreme Court can learn
from the lower courts' work. Anti-rulification rules, in short, can accomplish
and frustrate a variety of different doctrinal objectives.
Part IV then raises and addresses two follow-up questions regarding anti-
rulification rules. First, once the choice has been made to promulgate a rule
against rulification, how should the Court go about effectuating the command?
Second, how should lower courts determine whether the Supreme Court has
imposed an anti-rulification rule? Here, I offer a variety of prescriptive sugges-
tions. I posit, for instance, that the Court should take care to divorce its meth-
odological justifications for a rule against rulification from its substantive criti-
cisms of a particular rulification that a lower court has employed. I also suggest
that lower courts should embrace a default presumption against the existence
of rules against rulification, demanding from the Supreme Court a clear state-
ment as to when it intends to propound a mandatory standard as opposed to a
permissive one. But I also propose that when the Supreme Court has explicitly
articulated anti-rulification rules, lower courts should not dismiss them as non-
binding dicta.
In Part V, I consider variations on the theme of anti-rulification rules, im-
agining and evaluating other doctrinal formulations that the Supreme Court
might employ in attempting to control the manner in which lower courts apply
standards to individual cases. I discuss, for example, the possibility of "pro-
rulification rules," which expressly instruct the lower courts to rulify a standard
in whatever ways they deem fit. I also consider the possibility of "anti-
rulification standards," which, in contrast to true rules against rulification,
would merely discourage (but not prohibit) the development of rules to assist
in the application of Supreme Court standards. Finally, I imagine the possibil-
ity of "anti-publication rules," which would move even further in the direction
of anti-rulification rules by prohibiting the development of any legal prece-
dents whatsoever that concern a standard's application to individual cases.
The reader expecting a firm, generalized, and (dare I say) rule-like conclu-
sion regarding rules against rulification will not find it in the analysis that fol-
lows. The reason is that rules against rulification admit of few easy conclu-
sions. Sometimes they should be used, and other times they should not, and
the difficult challenge becomes identifying the considerations that weigh for
and against their operation. But there is one definitive point that I do hope to
establish: neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts can deal effectively
with rules against rulification unless they recognize their existence and appreci-
ate their importance. For this reason, the Article seeks to remove these rules
from the shadows and bring them into the light.
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I. THE POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES
A. Rules, Standards, and Specificity
What separates rules from standards? 9 The distinction depends in large
part on specificity.2' The paradigmatic "rule" falls toward the high end of the
specificity spectrum; it ascribes definitive consequences to the satisfaction of
precise and determinate criteria.' "Must be at least five feet tall to ride," for in-
stance, leaves little room for interpretation: if you are at least five feet tall, you
can go on the ride;' if you are shorter than five feet, there is no use waiting in
line. The paradigmatic "standard," by contrast, leaves many application-related
details unresolved.' "Must be mature enough to ride," for instance, offers only
a hazy definition of eligible riders. What does the sign mean by "mature"?
Who counts as "mature enough"? Many would-be riders cannot know in ad-
vance whether they will get to ride. They must await a final decision maker's
judgment to find out whether they may step aboard.
Extreme examples of rules and standards are easy to create, but what about
intermediate cases? How, for instance, should we classify the command, "Must
be approximately five feet tall (or taller) to ride"? That is less specific than the
ig. For a small sampling of the voluminous literature on rules and standards, see, for example,
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 (1992); Dun-
can Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1687-
1713 (1976); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175
(1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 1O6 HARv.
L. REy. 22 (1992); and Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995).
20. See, e.g., James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, loo
CALIF. L. REV. 115, 130 (2012) ("Rules and standards are primarily distinguished by their level
of specificity. Rules are more specific about what they require while standards tend to be
more general."); see also Kaplow, supra note 19, at 561-62 ("One can think of the choice be-
tween rules and standards as involving the extent to which a given aspect of a legal com-
mand should be resolved in advance or left to an enforcement authority to consider.").
21. In the words of Sullivan, "[a] legal directive is 'rule'-like when it binds a decisionmaker to
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts." Sullivan, supra
note 19, at 58.
22. Logically speaking, "must be at least five feet tall to ride" establishes a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition of ride eligibility. Strictly read, that is, the rule would not necessarily pre-
clude a ride administrator from prohibiting admission to a six-foot-tall individual deemed
otherwise unfit to ride. I am assuming here, however, that the average reader of the sign
would apply to it the more commonsense understanding that it guarantees ridership to all
individuals who are at least five feet tall.
23. Again, in Sullivan's words, "[a] legal directive is 'standard'-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a
fact situation." Sullivan, supra note 19, at 58.
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"five-foot" rule but more specific than the "mature enough" standard. Into
what category, then, should it fall? One could ponder this question at length,
but doing so would not yield much of a payoff. "Rules" and "standards" are
not Platonic essences; rather, they are man-made concepts that facilitate our
analysis of complex, real-world phenomena. For that reason, we need not (and
probably should not) bother to define a fixed point on the specificity spectrum
that divides the realm of rules from the realm of standards. 4 The two catego-
ries simply facilitate discussion of something that is very much a matter of de-
gree."
B. The Rulification Process
In a precedential system, the initial pronouncement of a legal norm marks
only the beginning of its development. As cases begin to arise under a non-
specific standard, courts must decide whether a particular set of facts satisfies
the standard's triggering criteria. By rendering such decisions-which carry
precedential force-courts will begin to elaborate on the content of the norm
itself. To be sure, the extent of elaboration depends on the initial specificity of
the norm. For highly specific rules, such as the "at least five feet tall" require-
ment, repeated determinations that an individual does or does not meet the
z4. See Frank Cross, Tonja Jacobi & Emerson Tiller, A Positive Political Theory of Rules and
Standards, 2012 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 18 ("The 'specificity-generality continuum' may be treated,
for simplification, as 'a dichotomy between "rules" and "standards.""' (quoting Isaac Ehrlich
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258
(1974))).
25. In identifying the rules and standards that emerge from judge-made doctrine, we must also
take care to distinguish between the "fact-specificity" of a court's analysis and the "guid-
ance-specificity" of a court's holding. These two variables often work at cross-purposes:
fact-specific reasoning yields generalized (standard-like) guidance, whereas generalized rea-
soning yields specific (rule-like) guidance. Suppose, for instance, that a court decides that a
driver should be penalized because and only because she exceeded a rate of ninety miles per
hour: abstracting away all other facets of the driver's driving, that is, the court treats the
single fact of the driver's speed as reason enough to impose the penalty. That holding would
reflect an affirmatively non-fact-specific analysis, but it would nonetheless create a highly
specific rule for future cases -namely, that driving in excess of ninety miles per hour is cate-
gorically illegal. If, by contrast, the court had scrutinized multiple aspects of the particular
driver's conduct- including, but not limited to, the rate of her speed-its opinion would
have yielded less specific guidance for future decision makers. If no one feature of the driv-
er's driving compelled the court's conclusion, then all that can be said for the holding is that
it seems to prohibit "unreasonable" driving, as judged by a comprehensive assessment of
each driver's conduct. The relevant sense in which rules are more "specific" than standards,
then, lies not in the degree to which application of a norm must engage with the specifics of
each case's facts, but rather in the level of instruction that the norm provides to its future
appliers.
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five-foot minimum are not likely to tell us significantly more about what the
five-foot requirement permits and prohibits. For less specific standards, by
contrast, common law adjudication stands ready to convert an open-ended
pronouncement into a far more specific patchwork of rules.
26
Return to the "mature enough to ride" requirement. Pronounced in the ab-
stract, the requirement offers little guidance as to whether a given individual is
eligible to board the ride. To be sure, some applications of the standard can be
immediately predicted: under virtually all plausible interpretations of the "ma-
ture enough" standard, a newborn baby probably cannot board the ride,
whereas a mild-mannered middle-ager will pose no problem. But harder cases
will arise: what about an eight-year-old? A ten-year-old? Someone who seems
physically mature but not emotionally mature, or vice versa? Adjudicators will
confront these sorts of "boundary" cases and, by resolving them, offer im-
portant glosses on what the norm commands. Suppose, for instance, that one
application of the standard denies eligibility to a twelve-year-old, while another
application grants eligibility to an otherwise similar thirteen-year-old. With
these applications in place - and exerting binding effect on future appliers of
the standard-we may now render more reliable predictions regarding further
26. This discussion draws on the work of Mark D. Rosen, who to my knowledge is the first
commentator to describe the rulification process along these lines. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen,
Modeling Constitutional Doctrine, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 691, 696 (2005) (noting that, as stand-
ards are applied over time, they "almost always become[] increasingly rule-like," and that
"[t]his occurs because cases involve particular facts" and "[a]s the cases are decided they be-
come showcases of what, as a concrete matter, the Legal Standard requires"); Mark D.
Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts
and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 479,491 (2000) ("As the Standard is ap-
plied over a series of cases, it almost always becomes increasingly rule-like. This occurs be-
cause cases, by nature, are disputes that involve particular facts. As the cases are decided
they become examples of what, as a concrete matter, the Standard means."). Frederick
Schauer has also written about the rulification phenomenon, although his focus is less on
the sort of "natural" rulification process that results from the accretion of judicial prece-
dents, and more on conscious decisions to inject rule-like language into the interstices that
standards leave open. See Schauer, supra note 13,at 805-06 (2005) ("Whether it be by im-
porting rules from elsewhere, or imposing rules of some sort on their own otherwise uncon-
strained decision-making, or filling decisional voids with three- and four-part tests, inter-
preters and enforcers of standards have tried to convert those standards into rules to a
surprising degree. .. ." (footnote omitted)); see also Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare
Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1904 (2008) (noting
that "courts frequently engage in what Frederick Schauer has called the 'rulification' of
standards, developing sub-principles that guide their application of standards"); Mark
Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 103, io6 (2012) (noting
the "tendency over time for courts to replace doctrine articulated in the form of standards
with doctrine articulated in the form of rules with exceptions"). It is these more conscious




applications of the standard. We will know, for instance, that being a teenager
counts as a factor in favor of ride eligibility, while being twelve or younger
counts as a factor against. A future case might also hold that anyone caught
cutting in line in the theme park will be deemed too immature to satisfy the
"mature enough" standard. With that case decided, we know that line cutters
are per se ineligible for a ride -even if other facts might cut the other way. As
these holdings continue to accrete, the judicially developed contours of the
"mature enough" standard will become more and more apparent.27 Eventually,
anyone who digs into the relevant case law should be able to translate the ini-
tially articulated standard into a rule-like formulation. Moreover, courts will
have accomplished this result without ever having purported to amend or re-
vise the standard itself. It is simply through the process of applying the norm
to case after case that courts nudge the norm up the specificity spectrum and
increase its rule-like character. This process of "rulifying" a standard is com-
mon and unobjectionable; indeed, it is a natural and recurring consequence of
issuing opinions with precedential effect.28
27. As Frederick Schauer has described the process:
Interpretations continuously change the options available to subsequent interpret-
ers, thus occasionally making quite precise clauses more open ended in practice
but more often making even the most open ended clauses substantially less so. For
example, given the almost infinite number of inequalities inherent in all legisla-
tion, the range of permissible applications of the equal protection clause, based on
the text alone, is vast. As subsequent interpretations have limited the number of
classifications that occasion meaningful equal protection scrutiny, however, the
linguistic frame of the text alone has been substantially reduced in size, and there-
fore the size of the field within the frame has also been reduced.
Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399,435 (1985).
z8. This is a point that sometimes gets elided in the rules-standards literature. To take a recent
example, Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson have argued "that Justice Scalia is wrong to in-
sist upon rules and only rules in adjudication in circumstances in which the Constitution
clearly prescribes standards instead .... If the Constitution prescribes the exercise of rela-
tively unconstrained judicial judgment in some contexts, that is its prerogative, however
wise or unwise that prescription might be." Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of
Law as a Law of Law, 90 NoTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2014), manuscript at 31, http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2412o5 [http://perma.cc/B7U 5-TGVW]; see also id. at 14 (noting that
"[t]here are numerous instances ... in which Justice Scalia has firmly opted for a rule-like
norm when the 'correct' originalist answer is either a standard or, at best, unclear"). But the
various constitutional provisions they cite in support of their claim- for instance, the Exces-
sive Fines Clause, the Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" requirement, and the Necessary
and Proper Clause-do not actually "prescribe" the use of standards by courts; rather, they
merely employ standards, without further specifying how courts should go about applying
those standards to the facts of individual cases. Calabresi and Lawson appear to be reading
rules against rulification into the constitutional text, where all the text actually reveals is a
set of plain-vanilla standards that judges might or might not choose to rulify as they see fit.
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The same cannot be said, however, when judges attempt the opposite
feat -that is, by "standard-ifying" a previously adopted rule. Suppose, for in-
stance, that a "five feet or taller" requirement is in effect. According to this rule,
all persons who are at least five feet tall are categorically eligible for the ride,
whereas all persons who fall below the threshold are categorically ineligible for
the ride. If a judge attempts to standard-ify this rule -by, say, creating an ex-
ception for someone who is "close to five feet in height and able to handle the
demands of the ride," or by clarifying that riders need only be "reasonably
tall" -she will now be creating law that conflicts with the original rule's sub-
stantive commands.29 Instead of clearing up a point of uncertainty that a norm
leaves open, the standard-ification process introduces substantive outcomes
that the norm had purported to close off. The "five feet or taller" rule, for ex-
ample, logically implied that no four-foot-eleven individuals could board the
ride; with the new standard-ified command in place, however, some four-foot-
eleven individuals can in fact make it on board. Thus, whereas rulifying stand-
ards merely adds paint to a canvas that a norm has left blank, standard-ifying
rules removes paint that was already there.
None of this is to say that lower courts do not ever standard-ify the Su-
preme Court's rules. Examples of that process, too, are not difficult to find.30
Nor is it to say that the standard-ification of rules is necessarily inconsistent
Of course, further examination of Founding-era evidence might reveal that the framers
understood the Constitution's standards to incorporate (albeit implicitly) a strong presump-
tion against judicial rulification. But see THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison) ("All new
laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most
mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their mean-
ing be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.").
But given that merely articulating a standard is not the same as actually prohibiting rulifica-
tion of that standard, the standard-like nature of various constitutional provisions does not
on its own demonstrate that Justice Scalia's preference for rules is textually illegitimate.
29. I do not argue that the "standard-ification" of rules is impossible. Indeed, the phenomenon
occurs all the time, as several scholars have documented. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 804-
05 (collecting examples). My point is merely that, within an operating legal hierarchy, only
the highest-ranking court within the hierarchy may "standard-ify" the rules it has promul-
gated, whereas both that court and its lower-ranking subordinates may "rulify" its stand-
ards. Cf. Frederick N. Schauer, Editor's Introduction, Llewellyn on Rules, in KARL LLEWEL-
LYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 24 (Frederick N. Schauer ed., 2011) ("The central feature of a
rule, and one especially apparent when rules are compared to standards, is entrenchment, the
firmly fixed instructions that will resist the urge on the part of an interpreter, applier, or en-
forcer to avoid the rule in the service of what the interpreter, applier, or enforcer believes the
purpose behind the rule to be, or believes the best all-things-considered decision would
be.").
30. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 13, at 804 ("From the American Legal Realists to the present,
legal theorist[s] have devoted some attention to the ways in which seemin[g]ly cri[sp] rules
may have their edges rounded upon application, interpretation, or enforcement.").
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with vertical stare decisis norms; even if rounding out the edges of a bright-
line command creates some substantive inconsistencies with the Court's origi-
nal instructions, there are still ways to characterize the change as something
other than outright defiance of the instructions themselves.31 But it is to sug-
gest that, in light of the dictates of vertical stare decisis, lower courts face a
lesser justificatory burden when attempting to move the doctrine in the direc-
tion of more specificity rather than less. A court might, for instance, permissi-
bly declare that the "five-foot" rule requires measurements that include the
height of a would-be rider's shoes, it might require that the controlling meas-
urement occur within sixty days of the ride, and so on, all without having to
explain away any seeming inconsistencies with the original set of instructions
that the high court established. But these holdings render the rule more specif-
ic, not less. Any attempt, by contrast, to standard-ify the rule -by introducing,
for example, a soft exception to the five-foot-tall requirement-can succeed on-
ly when the decision maker further demonstrates that the seemingly categorical
five-foot minimum can in fact accommodate some riders who are less than five
feet tall.3 Under a strict stare decisis regime, then, highly specific rules are at
31. Perhaps, for instance, a lower court might suggest that a doctrinal norm that seems categor-
ical on its face actually contains a safety valve for cases where hard-and-fast adherence to the
rule would otherwise yield absurd or unjust results. Relatedly, some might argue that even
the most absolute doctrinal commands remain subordinate to a global, superseding norm
that always permits courts to soften the edges of a categorical rule when circumstances so
warrant. On this view, the standard-ification of a rule need not amount to a changing of the
rule itself; rather, when standard-ifying rules, a court simply applies features of the doctrine
already in place. When accused of amending or repealing a categorical rule, that is, the
standard-ifying judge might simply reply, "The law always permitted me to do this, because
the law has never tolerated total absoluteness in its doctrinal commands."
But even if there exists a conception of the law under which courts can standard-ify
rules without overruling prior precedents, the key point for our purposes is that this move
will generally require a higher justificatory burden than a move in the inverse direction.
However we characterize the standard-ification of rules-whether involving the alteration of
existing precedent, the use of implicit safety valves built into a rule, the invocation of super-
seding principles of equity, and so forth -the process requires a judge to acknowledge that a
doctrinal framework has become too constrictive and thus requires a reduction in constric-
tiveness. Such express methodological tinkering need not (and often does not) occur when
courts rulify standards; rulification, unlike standard-ification, arises as a mere byproduct of
a court's substantive reasoning. In general, adding a precedent regarding the application of
law to fact provides more information (and hence increased specificity) regarding the law's
application in future cases. The "natural" direction of doctrinal development, in other
words, is in the direction of more and more specificity regarding the content of a legal norm.
The rulifier of standards simply drifts along with the current, whereas the standard-ifier of
rules must struggle to swim upstream.
32. One further clarification: nothing in the foregoing analysis should be read to suggest that
lower courts cannot reduce the specificity of rules that they themselves have rendered. Only
its own internal rules of stare decisis would stand in the way of a subsequent lower court's
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least somewhat insulated against standard-ification in the courts subordinate
to the rule's promulgator, whereas not-so-specific standards are inherently ex-
posed to rulification in these subordinate courts. As a result, if the creator of a
standard wants to prevent rulification, then she must do something more than
simply articulate the standard itself.
C. Rules Against Rulification
What, then, might superior courts do to prevent rulification of their stand-
ards by subordinate tribunals? The answer is to fortify the standard with a
supplemental command concerning the method with which to apply the stand-
ard. In the same way that a superior court demands adherence to the substan-
tive standard it has adopted, it might also require applying that standard in a
way that does not produce a body of ancillary rules. Continuing with our hypo-
thetical, we might imagine the creator of the "mature enough to ride" standard
stipulating that the maturity of a given rider must be evaluated on an individu-
alized, case-by-case basis, according to the "totality of the circumstances," and
without reliance on generalizations, presumptions, per se exemptions, and the
like.33 Higher courts could also strike down lower court precedents that have
taken the doctrine too far up the specificity spectrum, identifying error in over-
ly mechanical reasoning that does away with much of a standard's flexibility.
Any sort of command along these lines qualifies as a "rule against rulification";
the creator of the standard not only prescribes a substantive standard for future
courts to apply, but also takes the further step of instructing future courts not
to rulify the standard when applying it to concrete cases. 4
attempt to undo its own previously adopted rulification of a standard. For instance, if a low-
er court thinks better of a previous elaboration on the "mature enough to ride" requirement,
then it might well be able to overrule its prior precedent and reduce the overall specificity of
its doctrinal commands. What the lower court cannot do, however, is displace a higher court
rule with a standard of its own. It could not, for instance, declare that it would prefer to ap-
ply a "reasonably tall" requirement instead of the "five feet tall" requirement that the Court
has instructed it to apply.
33. As the next Part will reveal, many of the Supreme Court's anti-rulification rules take the
form of instructions to consider "the totality of the circumstances" when applying a stand-
ard to the facts of a case. But while a mandated totality of circumstances inquiry reflects one
potential formulation of a rule against rulification, the Court can use (and has indeed used)
other formulations as well.
34. For the more visually oriented, the following diagrams offer another illustration of the basic
idea. Suppose that some doctrinal command, A, lies toward the "standard" end of the
rule/standard spectrum. If A is a permissive standard, we may expect some lower courts to
adopt successive rulifications of A-call them R,(A), R2(A), R3(A), etc. -whose cumulative




At this point, an important question emerges: won't anti-rulification efforts
always prove futile in the end? After all, as originally described, rulification oc-
curs as a natural byproduct of precedent-driven decision making. The more
cases the courts decide, the more data we acquire regarding the standard's
scope and substance. The inevitable consequence of this process is an increas-
ingly specific set of elaborations on the standard, and these elaborations should
eventually come to light regardless of whether courts articulate their holdings
in terms of generalizations, presumptions, and other rule-like norms. If the
process really does work in this manner, then the only viable means of prohib-
iting the rulification of a standard would be to prohibit lower courts from cre-
ating any precedents about the standard at all. Absent this extreme solution,"
however, some amount of rulification will always occur. The specificity of the
norm will inevitably rise as the number of on-point judicial precedents increas-
es. Given that fact, it seems that, in the long run, no rule against rulification
will ever manage to achieve its underlying objective.
One may accept the premise of this objection without accepting the conclu-
sion. The key is to recognize that, even though the rulification of standards
might inevitably occur in a precedent-driven system, the pace at which it oc-
curs can still be controlled. Suppose that Suzie Q, a thirteen-year-old veteran of
the fairground, wishes to experience a ride that is subject to our open-ended
"mature enough" requirement. The case comes before a judge, who decides
that Suzie Qis in fact mature enough to ride. What does the decision of In re
Suzie Qtell us about the "mature enough" standard? At a minimum, it tells us
that children identical to Suzie Qwill satisfy the "mature enough" standard go-
ing forward. But precisely how, and to what extent, must those children re-
semble Suzie Q? The answer to this question depends on the reasoning of the
Suzie Qdecision itself. If the judge issues an opinion declaring that Suzie Q
was mature enough to ride because and only because she was a teenager, that
opinion will fill a huge swath of previously unoccupied doctrinal space. Going
forward, we would know that the "mature enough" requirement incorporates a
strong presumption of ride-worthiness applicable to all children age thirteen
A- - - R,(A) - - - > R 2(A) - - - 4 R 3(A) ... (rulification process)
Standard ------------------------------ -- >Rule
If A is a mandatory standard, by contrast, any such rule-ward movement will be barred, and
the relevant doctrine will remain in the form of A, relatively near the point on the
rule/standard spectrum at which it originally existed. (Here the anti-rulification rule is rep-
resented by a closed bracket, which "blocks" any potential movement of A in a rule-ward di-
rection.)
A - - 4) (blocked by rule against rulification)
Standard -------------------- -- >Rule
35. For an extended discussion of this possibility, see infra Part V.C.
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and up. If, by contrast, the judge issues an opinion declaring that Suzie Q~s
maturity is evident from a holistic combination of her individual attributes-
her age, her size, her demeanor, her past experience at theme parks, etc. - then
the opinion will provide far less specification as to how future cases should be
resolved. We would know that children similar to Suzie Qhave a good chance
of satisfying the "mature enough" standard, but we could still only hazard
guesses as to how similar to Suzie Qthe kids must be. These two contrasting
decisions in the Suzie Qcase -although they yield the same disposition-carry
substantially different consequences for the rulification process. One moves the
process along quite a bit; the other merely inches it forward.
In this respect, judges can indeed control the extent to which they rulify a
standard in any given case, even if they cannot control the inevitable fact that,
as they decide more cases, the substance of the standard will become increas-
ingly rule-like. This point, in turn, means that rules against rulification, while
perhaps not capable of stopping the process outright, can at least decelerate it.
Bound by a rule against rulification, our lower court judge will be less likely to
resolve In re Suzie Qaccording to categorical reasoning (that is, "Suzie Qgets
to go on the ride because and only because she is a teenager") and more in-
clined to employ a mushier and more holistic analysis (that is, "Suzie Q0gets to
go on the ride because, all things considered, she seems like a pretty mature
kid"). The rule against rulification therefore tends to reduce the extent of fu-
ture substantive guidance provided by the decision, yielding a slower rate of
rulification over time. For this reason, anti-rulification rules can in fact have
significant practical effects. At the very least, they ensure that standards remain
static over the short run, even if they inevitably evolve into rules over the long
run.
D. Subtleties, Nuances, and Complicating Factors
Lurking beneath the seemingly simple terms "rules," "standards," "rulifica-
tion," and "anti-rulification rules" are layers upon layers of complexity. The
discussion thus far has steered clear of complicating details, relying on artificial
examples to elucidate the core features of the concepts introduced. Before mov-
ing from tidy theory to messy reality, however, we should expose some of these
simplifying assumptions; this endeavor reveals some difficulties that arise
when one attempts to classify and evaluate anti-rulification rules in the real
world.
First, as we have already seen, the distinction between rules and standards
is anything but clean. The concepts merely approximate a property that is very
much a matter of degree. What is more, even when we replace the binary
rule/standard frame with scalar comparisons of specificity, determining the ex-
tent to which one norm is more or less specific than another is not always a
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straightforward exercise. 6 But even though boundary cases will prove difficult,
their existence does not a useless concept make, and there remain many scenar-
ios in which the labels "rule," "standard," "more specific," and "less specific"
can advance the analysis in a useful and understandable way.
Second, and related to the first point, I have sometimes spoken as if the
"rulification" process involves the straightforward conversion of standards into
rules. But this, too, is an oversimplification. "Rulification," as I understand it,
occurs any time a judicial decision materially increases the specificity of a con-
trolling legal norm. This increase in specificity can happen when paradigmatic
standards become paradigmatic rules. But it can also happen, for instance,
when courts make specific rules even more specific (for example, "In applying
the requirement that would-be riders must be at least five feet tall, we will
henceforth always measure the rider's height without reference to the shoes she
is wearing."), or when courts make highly amorphous standards somewhat less
so (for example, "In applying the requirement that riders must be 'mature
enough' to board the ride, we will henceforth measure maturity by reference to
physical, rather than emotional, characteristics."). For simplicity's sake, it may
be helpful to view standards as the input of a rulification process and rules as
the output, but nothing of significance turns on this particular point. What
matters most for our purposes is that (a) courts put "meat on the bone" of a le-
gal directive when they apply that directive to future fact patterns, and (b) the
Supreme Court sometimes seeks to discourage lower courts from doing just
that.
Third, as we will soon see, the Supreme Court does not always speak with
clarity regarding the existence of a rule against rulification. Sometimes, for in-
stance, the Court may offer a lengthy justification for its own decision to favor
a standard over a rule without indicating whether the same reasoning extends
to lower court rulification of the standard. Sometimes, the Court may reject a
particular rulification of a standard without further indicating whether its rejec-
tion of that rulification extends to alternative rulifications as well. In these and
other cases, Supreme Court precedents leave anti-rulification rules debatably-
and not definitively-present in the doctrine. In Part III of the Article, I will
consider this problem in greater detail. For now, it suffices to note that observ-
36. Try ranking the following three norms in terms of their specificity: (a) a categorical com-
mand with an amorphous exception built into it ("no one less than five feet tall may board
the ride, except where justice demands"); (b) a non-categorical presumption with no excep-
tions attached ("we should in all cases disfavor letting people on rides who are less than five
feet tall"); or (c) an open-ended norm that categorically excludes consideration of certain
criteria ("only riders who are sufficiently mature may board the ride, provided that maturity
is adjudged solely by reference to physical characteristics"). Different readers, I suspect, will
come up with different answers.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ers will not always agree on whether the Court has injected anti-rulification
rules into its case law.
Finally, I have thus far spoken as if doctrine can be reliably trusted to con-
strain future decision making. But this, too, is an oversimplification. Courts do
not always abide by the precedents to which they are bound. Sometimes they
forget about a controlling case; sometimes they misread an opinion; sometimes
they willfully ignore the law. Doctrine does not constrain as much as it pur-
ports to constrain. Whatever influences it brings to bear must compete with a
host of countervailing forces: human error, political pressure, and results-
oriented reasoning, to name a few. Even if controlling Supreme Court prece-
dent dictates that a lower court must apply a standard on a case-by-case basis,
that command itself provides no guarantee that lower courts will always do so.
Even so, as long as rules against rulification sometimes operate as advertised,
an investigation into their legal and doctrinal character strikes me as well worth
conducting. The project becomes fruitless, in other words, only on the premise
that legal doctrine exerts no force whatsoever on judicial decision making. That
premise strikes me as implausible.37 At the same time, nothing in the pages that
follow should be taken to imply a total faith in the constraining nature of legal
doctrine. Rather, the analysis proceeds on the premise that rules against rulifi-
cation, like many other doctrinal rules, will at least sometimes be taken serious-
ly by the lower courts tasked with applying Supreme Court law. 
8
II. THE REALITY OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES
Having established the conceptual possibility of rules against rulification, I
now turn to the question of their real-world existence. This Part has two aims.
37. That is especially so, moreover, in the sorts of cases on which this Article focuses: run-of-
the-mill lower court cases that lack politically salient dimensions. Cf. Michael J. Klarman,
Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 138 n.95
(2013) (suggesting that "legal doctrine matters little in landmark constitutional decisions,"
and that "the more passionately judges care about the underlying policy issue, the less con-
straint they are likely to feel from the traditional legal sources").
38. One final subtlety worth pointing out: in studying the use of anti-rulification rules by the
Supreme Court, I do not mean to suggest that other institutional actors are not capable of
producing similar rules. Most obviously, state supreme courts can issue their own anti-
rulification rules in connection with supreme pronouncements of state law. Of equal im-
portance, both state supreme courts and U.S. circuit courts can attach anti-rulification rules
to federal-law standards that the Supreme Court itself has treated as permissive. In other
words, even if the Court has opted not to yoke a substantive standard to an anti-rulification
rule, nothing prohibits an intermediate court from prohibiting intrajurisdictional trial courts
from rulifying those standards for themselves. Legislatures might also adopt rules against
rulification in connection with whatever substantive standards they have enacted into law.
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The first is to demonstrate that the Supreme Court does in fact issue rules
against rulification. The second is to show that the Court's anti-rulification
commands do not amount to meaningless blather. In other words, the Part at-
tempts to show both that the Court has injected anti-rulification rules into a
variety of doctrinal areas and that lower courts at least sometimes pay attention
to those rules when applying the substantive standards to which they attach.
A. The Supreme Court's Commands
Florida v. Harris provides a nice introductory example of an anti-rulification
rule. As we have already seen, the Court in Harris made clear that, in applying
the probable cause test, lower court judges must reject "rigid rules, bright-line
tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-
considered approach."39 Similar pronouncements have arisen in other areas of
Fourth Amendment law. For instance, in evaluating the voluntariness of a de-
fendant's consent to a search, the Court has "eschewed bright-line rules" and
"disavowed any 'litmus-paper test[s],"' favoring instead a "traditional contex-
tual approach" that accommodates the "endless variations in the facts and cir-
40 documstances" that individual cases present. It has done the same in defining
the conditions under which citizens' encounters with the police count as a
Fourth Amendment "seizure." 4' And in asking whether exigent circumstances
justify a warrantless search, the Court has recently called for a "finely tuned
39. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055-56 (2013). Harris's anti-rulification commands accord
with other Supreme Court descriptions of the probable cause standard. See, e.g., Maryland
v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) ("The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise
definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends
on the totality of the circumstances."); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 235 (1983) (reject-
ing a previous formulation of the probable cause standard as a "complex superstructure of
evidentiary and analytical rules," and instead describing probable cause as a "fluid concept-
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts - not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules").
40. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506
(1983); Michigan v. Chesternet, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988)); see also Michigan v. Ches-
ternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) ("Rather than adopting either rule proposed by the par-
ties and determining that an investigatory pursuit is or is not necessarily a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, we adhere to our traditional contextual approach, and determine only
that, in this particular case, the police conduct in question did not amount to a seizure.").
41. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991) (noting that the lower court "erred in adopt-
ing a per se rule" to determine whether a police encounter constituted a Fourth Amendment
seizure, and insisting that lower courts should "consider all the circumstances surrounding
the encounter" in applying the applicable test).
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approach"42 that evaluates "each case of alleged exigency based 'on its own facts
and circumstances.' 43
Other areas of criminal procedure reveal anti-rulification rules at work. For
example, the Court's suggestive identification jurisprudence -which asks
whether police identification procedures violate a defendant's right to due pro-
cess - "requires courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether improper po-
lice conduct created a 'substantial likelihood of misidentification."'" Similarly,
when asking whether "extraordinary circumstances" justify the equitable toll-
ing of postconviction filing deadlines, courts must apply the test "on a case-by-
case basis," so as to avoid creating "'hardships which, from time to time, arise
from a hard and fast adherence' to more absolute legal rules."4 In describing
the reasonableness standard that defines the Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel, the Court has emphasized that "specific guidelines
are not appropriate" and that "[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's
conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by
defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions" that counsel might
make., 6 Moreover, in articulating the boundaries of so-called "plain error" doc-
42. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013) (quoting Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318, 347 n.16 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Id. (quoting Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (193)); cf Mincey V.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978) (rejecting the state court's attempt to adopt a categorical
"murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement, and concluding that the warrantless
search of the defendant's apartment "was not constitutionally permissible simply because a
homicide had recently occurred there").
44. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2012) (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
201 (1972)); see also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (holding that, when
assessing police identification procedures, "each case must be considered on its own facts").
45. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649-50 (2010) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360,
375 (1964); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
46. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 14o6 (2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 1407 n.17
("[T]he Strickland test of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence."
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). A related example comes from Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470
(2000), which concerned an attorney's failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Two lower
courts had held that an attorney's failure to file such a notice qualified as per se deficient un-
der Strickland absent an explicit request from the defendant not to do so. Id. at 478. The
Court rejected this formulation, concluding that it "failed to engage in the circumstance-
specific reasonableness inquiry" that Strickland required. Id.; see also Chaidez v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1119-20 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the distinc-
tion between misrepresentations and omissions, on which the majority relies in classifying
lower court precedent, implies a categorical rule that is inconsistent with Strickland's re-
quirement of a case-by-case assessment of an attorney's performance").
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trine (governing forfeiture of claims not raised at trial), the Court has warned
of the dangers associated with "a 'per se approach to plain-error review' - an
approach it has found to be flatly inconsistent with the "case-specific and fact-
intensive basis" on which plain error analysis is supposed to proceed.47
The Court has also invoked anti-rulification rules in civil cases. When it
first set forth the three-part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 8 for in-
stance, the Court made clear that the open-ended nature of the test reflected
"the truism that "'[d]ue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.'
49
Following up on this point some twenty years later, the Court invalidated a
lower court's attempt to embed an "absolute rule" within the Mathews frame-
work, reasoning that the precedential support for such an approach was "far
outweighed by the clarity of our precedents which emphasize the flexibility of
due process as contrasted with the sweeping and categorical rule" the lower
court had adopted."0 Or as the Court has more recently put it, "[b]ecause the
requirements of due process are 'flexible and cal[l] for such procedural protec-
tions as the particular situation demands,' we generally have declined to estab-
lish rigid rules and instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the suffi-
ciency of particular procedures.""'
Consider also the Court's recent description of the "equitable principles"
governing the issuance of permanent injunctions in civil cases. In eBay v.
MercExchange, the Court defined these principles in terms of a "four-factor
test" and then went on to fault both lower court decisions in the case for
47. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 142 (2009) (quoting United States v. Young, 470
U.S. 1, 16 n.14 (1985)). More particularly, the anti-rulification rule here concerns the fourth
prong of the plain error test, which asks whether failure to address a forfeited error on ap-
peal would result in a "miscarriage of justice." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736
(1993). It is this component of the plain error inquiry, the Court has made clear, that "is
meant to be applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive basis." Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142.
48. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Under the Mathews test, courts must weigh "[flirst, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest." Id. at 335.
49. Id. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961)) (alteration in original); see also Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985) ("The flexibility of our approach in due process cases is intended in
part to allow room for other forms of dispute resolution; with respect to the individual in-
terests at stake here, legislatures are to be allowed considerable leeway to formulate such
processes without being forced to conform to a rigid constitutional code of procedural ne-
cessities.").
50. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931 (1997).
s. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
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applying this test in an unduly rulified way." The district court, that is, had
erred by "appear[ing] to adopt certain expansive principles suggesting that
injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases." 3 The court of
appeals had erred, meanwhile, by adopting a "general rule" that was too
accepting of injunctive relief.' Though each court had reached a different
result, both had committed the same methodological mistake: "Just as the
District Court erred in its categorical denial of injunctive relief, the Court of
Appeals erred in its categorical grant of such relief."'5 Both lower courts, in
other words, had ignored the fact that the relevant doctrinal analysis depended
on "traditional equitable principles," which "do not permit such broad
classifications. ''s6 Going forward, as Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion put
the point, courts were to apply the "well-established[] four-factor test-
without resort to categorical rules."s'
Various substantive standards in intellectual property law have also been
yoked to rules against rulification. In articulating the standard for determining
whether a claimed invention is too "obvious" to qualify as patentable, the
Court once faulted the Federal Circuit for "analyz[ing] the issue in a narrow,
rigid manner inconsistent with [the Patent Act] and our precedents." 8 These
precedents, the Court emphasized, "set forth an expansive and flexible ap-
52. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 393-94 (20o6) (articulating the "tradi-
tional test" for determining when a defendant is entitled to injunctive relief). The Court has
applied a somewhat similar test in connection with preliminary injunctions, one that also
purports to discourage rulification in the courts below. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (20o8) ("In each case, courts 'must balance the competing
claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of
the requested relief."' (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987))). See
generally Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REv. (forth-
coming 2015), manuscript at 34-35, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436614 [http://perma.cc/9LJ7
-2T2W] (suggesting that Winter "extend[ed] eBay to preliminary injunctions").
53. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393.
s4. Id. at 393-94.
5. Id. at 394.
56. Id. at 393. But see Holland v. Florida, 56o U.S. 631, 669 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that the Court had previously "rejected th[e] canard" that "all general rules are ipsofacto
incompatible with equity").
57. eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,
707 F. 3d 1036, lo44 (9 th Cir. 2012) (noting that in eBay, the Court "disapproved of the use
of 'categorical' rules regarding irreparable harm in patent infringement cases"); Richard
Dannay, Copyright Injunctions and Fair Use: Enter eBay-Four-Factor Fatigue or Four-Factor
Freedom?, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y 449, 457 (20o8) (attributing to eBay the proposition that
"[t]here can be no categorical rules, no categorical denial of injunctive relief or categorical
grant of such relief").
58. KSRInt'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427-28 (2007).
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proach" to obviousness determinations, which should not be "trans-
form[ed] ... into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry." 9 The Court
has sung a similar tune in defining copyright law's "fair use" defense, admon-
ishing that the analysis of fair-use claims is "not to be simplified with bright-
line rules. "6O Congress, in short, had "eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach to
fair use" when it codified the defense, meaning that any fair-use claim "has to
work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged case by case, in light
of the ends of the copyright law. ,
62
Finally, consider the Court's Takings Clause doctrine. While the Court has
characterized some types of government conduct as "per se" takings, 6, it has
emphasized that outside the context of these "per se" categories, takings analy-
sis must proceed in a manner that accounts for the "particular circumstances of
each case."6, In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, for instance,
a lower court had held that recurrent, though temporary, floodings of land
could never constitute a taking of property.6 But the Court rejected this "cate-
gorical bar" as inconsistent with the principle that "no magic formula enables a
court to judge, in every case, whether a given government interference with
property is a taking., 66 Much to the contrary, the Court held, "[filooding cas-
es, like other takings cases, should be assessed with reference to the 'particular
circumstances of each case,' and not by resorting to blanket exclusionary
59. Id. at 415, 419.
6o. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
61. Id. at 584 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 499 n.31
(1984)).
62. Id. at 581.
63. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,_5o5 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (creating a per se rule for
"total regulatory takings"); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
441 (1982) (creating a per se rule for physical takings).
64. United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); see also United States v.
Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952) ("No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish com-
pensable losses from noncompensable losses."). Also within the takings context, the Court
has arguably adopted an anti-rulification rule in connection with the Takings Clause's pub-
lic use requirement. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) ("[O]ur pub-
lic use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas ...."); United States v. Toronto,
Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949) ("Perhaps no warning has
been more repeated than that the determination of value [for just-compensation purposes]
cannot be reduced to inexorable rules.").
65. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'nv. United States, 637 F.3d 1366,1374, 1376 (Fed. Cit. 2011), rev'd,
133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
66. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 521.
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rules.' 6' The proper approach, in other words, called for "situation-specific
factual inquiries."
68
In sum, several different areas of Supreme Court doctrine, 69 spanning both
constitutional and non-constitutional cases, reveal attempts by the Court to
dictate not just the substance of a doctrinal standard, but also the method by
which lower courts should apply the standard in future cases. With that in
mind, let's now investigate whether the lower courts pay attention to these
commands once they have been put in place.
B. The Lower Courts'Responses
This Part highlights lower court cases that cite anti-rulification rules as
reasons not to rulify a standard. In considering a potential rule-like application
of a standard, the courts deciding these cases have invoked the authority of an
anti-rulification rule as precluding such an approach. These examples cannot
definitely prove that anti-rulification rules carry real-world force. Sometimes,
67. Id. at 521 (quoting Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. at 168).
68. Id. at 518.
69. There are other examples. In the securities fraud context, for instance, the Court has recent-
ly held that determining "the materiality of adverse event reports" under Section io(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule lob-5 "cannot be reduced to a bright-line rule"
and instead requires a "contextual inquiry." Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct.
1309, 1313-14, 1321 (2011). Similarly, in the employment discrimination context, the Court
has held that the remedy-related provisions of Title VII "do not permit a court to announce
a categorical rule precluding an expressly authorized form of relief as inappropriate in all
cases in which the employee has signed an arbitration agreement," because the relevant stat-
utory language "obviously refer[s] to the trial judge's discretion in a particular case to order
reinstatement and award damages in an amount warranted by the facts of that case." EEOC
v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 292-93 (2002); see also id. at 304 n.8 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) ("I agree with the Court that, in order to determine whether a particular remedy is
,appropriate,' it is necessary to examine the specific facts of the case at hand. For this reason,
the statutory scheme does not permit us to announce a categorical rule barring lower courts
from ever awarding a form of relief expressly authorized by the statute. When the same set
of facts arises in different cases, however, such cases should be adjudicated in a consistent
manner. Therefore, this Court surely may specify particular circumstances under which it
would be inappropriate for trial courts to award certain types of relief, such as victim-
specific remedies." (citation omitted)). And just this past term, the Court rejected the Feder-
al Circuit's approach to awarding attorneys' fees under the Patent Act, characterizing it as an
"overly rigid" formulation that "superimpose[d] an inflexible framework onto statutory text
that is inherently flexible," and stipulating that courts should conduct the fee-related inquiry
"in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstanc-
es." Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014); see al-
so Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (noting that




for instance, lower courts might invoke the Court's anti-rulification rules as
post-hoc rationalizations for holdings that they were already inclined to issue.7'
Nevertheless, the examples provide some evidence that anti-rulification rules
do at least place some weight on the methodological scale, rendering judges
less inclined to rulify the Supreme Court's standards than they otherwise
would be.
Consider first the lower courts' applications of the Fourth Amendment
probable cause standard. In United States v. Brundidge,7' the Eleventh Circuit
declined to invalidate a search based on an affidavit that lacked independent
police corroboration. The problem, in short, was that such a holding would ef-
fectively "requir[e] independent police corroboration . . . as a per se rule in
each and every case."' Such a rule was inappropriate, the court reasoned, not
only because it lacked direct support in prior cases, 3 but also, and more fun-
damentally, because the Supreme Court has "criticiz[ed] per se rules for the de-
termination of probable cause."74 Other lower courts have employed analogous
reasoning to reject related rulifications of both the probable cause standard and
other Supreme Court standards within Fourth Amendment law.7'
70. Sometimes, in fact, lower court dissenters have accused their colleagues of outright ignoring
the Court's anti-rulification rules. See, e.g., United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, ilo6
(9 th Cit. 2005) (en banc) (Gould, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of "adopting a
bright-line, 'one size fits all' plain error rule, in violation of a rule against rulification).
71. 170 F.3d 135o (lith Cit. 1999).
72. Id. at 1353.
73. Id. (noting that "independent police corroboration has never been treated as a requirement
in each and every case").
74. Id.
75. Such claims involve, for instance, the voluntariness of a defendant's consent to search. See,
e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia, 7o8 F.3d 682, 688 (5th Cir. 2013) ("Gonzalez appears
to argue that consent is coerced whenever police use an unwarned statement to obtain con-
sent. But a categorical rule is inconsistent with the multi-factor, holistic approach to as-
sessing voluntariness that this Court and the Supreme Court have endorsed."); United
States v. Montgomery, 621 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cit. 2010) (rejecting "a per se rule that medi-
cation (or intoxication) necessarily defeats an individual's capacity to consent" on the
ground that "per se rules are anathema to the Fourth Amendment"); United States v.
Guimond, 116 F.3 d 166, 170-71 (6th Cir. 1997) (highlighting "the Supreme Court's fourth
attempt to point out that per se or bright-line rules are inconsistent with that court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence" before rejecting a proposed bright-line rule that would have au-
tomatically linked the presence of an illegal detention to a finding of involuntary consent).
Such claims have also involved the presence of Fourth Amendment seizures. See, e.g., United
States v. Stephens, 232 F. 3d 746, 747-48 (9 th Cir. 2000) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (admonishing the majority for adopting a per se rule contrary
to controlling Supreme Court precedent); United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3 d 127o, 1275
(loth Cit. 2000) (refusing to follow the Eleventh Circuit's "per se rule that authorities must
notify bus passengers of the right to refuse consent before questioning those passengers and
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Similar results appear in cases concerning the right to effective assistance of
counsel, where the Court has warned against the use of specific guidelines to
assess the reasonableness of an attorney's conduct.76 In Harrington v. Gillis,7
for example, the Third Circuit reviewed the ineffective-assistance claim of a
habeas petitioner, who argued that his defense attorney's failure to appeal from
a criminal conviction violated the Sixth Amendment. The state court had re-
jected this claim,"' invoking a prior case in which it had held that "before a
court will find ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to file a direct appeal,
Appellant must prove that he requested an appeal and that counsel disregarded
this request."'79 But the Third Circuit rejected the state court's reasoning, hold-
ing that it contravened clearly established federal law. The problem, again, had
to do with the method of analysis reflected by the state court's approach. The
Supreme Court had "definitively rejected any per se rules for adjudicating
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, "s, and the state court had attempted
to apply a per se rule. Put another way, the state court had treated one and only
one feature of the counsel's conduct "as dispositive," when it should have "con-
sider[ed] all the circumstances" presented by the claim, thus "engag[ing] in
the circumstance-specific reasonableness inquiry required by Strickland."
8
asking for consent to search luggage," and holding instead that "such notification is a rele-
vant fact to consider, [but] cannot be dispositive of the reasonableness inquiry"). Finally,
these claims have involved the presence of exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless
search. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 488 F. App'x 99, 103 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[W]e have
... established that the appropriate inquiry when evaluating exigent circumstances is to
consider the totality of the circumstances .... "). Relatedly, lower courts have invoked the
Court's anti-rulification rules when evaluating due process claims arising from suggestive
identification procedures. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cook, 706 F.3d 25, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2013) (en-
dorsing a "totality of the circumstances" approach to determine the likelihood of misidenti-
fication (citing Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 724-25 (2012))).
76. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1407 (2011) (noting that "[t]he Court of Ap-
peals erred in attributing strict rules to this Court's recent case law").
77. 456 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2006).
78. Id. at 126.
79. Commonwealth v. Harmon, 738 A.2d 1023, 1O24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
80. Harrington, 456 F.3d at 126. But see United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148 (ioth Cir.
2010) (endorsing "a narrow per se rule of ineffectiveness where a defendant is, unbeknownst
to him, represented by someone who has not been admitted to any bar based on his 'failure
to ever meet the substantive requirements for the practice of law.'" (quoting Solina v. Unit-
ed States, 709 F.2d 16o, 167 (2d Cir. 1983))).
81. Harrington, 456 F.3d at 126 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88
(1984); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478-79 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). For additional examples of lower court adherence to anti-rulification rules in ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel cases, see Miles v. Ryan, 713 F.3d 477, 491-92 (9th Cir. 2012) (hold-
ing, in light of Pinholster's anti-rulification rule, that the defendant's attorney did not act
unreasonably simply by deciding not to investigate the defendant's social history); Com-
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Procedural due process doctrine also provides examples of lower courts tak-
ing seriously the Supreme Court's anti-rulification commands. In McClure v.
Biesenbach,82 for instance, the Fifth Circuit made short shrift of a claim that due
process required pre-deprivation proceedings before a municipality abated a
noise nuisance. Such a "per se" claim wouldn't work, the court explained, be-
cause "the mandates of due process are inherently flexible, and the courts must
balance public and private interests." 83 More generally, courts have repeatedly
incanted Mathews's anti-rulification rhetoric, emphasizing, for instance, that
"administrative proceedings ... must be carefully assessed to determine what
process is due given the specific circumstances involved, " 84 and that "f[t] he pre-
cise procedural protections of due process vary, depending upon the circum-
stances, because due process is a flexible concept unrestricted by any bright-
line rules."
s
Consider, too, the way in which the Court's eBay86 decision has affected
subsequent lower court analyses of equitable remedies. In Sanders v. Mountain
America Federal Credit Union, for example, the Tenth Circuit invalidated a
"pleading rule" that a district court had applied to requests for injunctive relief
under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA).87 The rule, as the Tenth Cir-
cuit described it, "require[d] all consumers who seek to compel TILA rescission
[of an unlawful loan] to plead their ability to repay the loan" as a precondition
monwealth v. Philistin, 53 A.3d 1, 26 (Pa. 2012) (noting that "specific guidelines are not ap-
propriate" for determining whether an "attorney's representation amounted to incompe-
tence" (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); State v. Starks, 833 N.W.2d 146, 164 (Wis. 2013) (acknowledging "that Strickland
[does not] impose[] a constitutional duty upon counsel to investigate"). Lower courts have
expressed similar reluctance to rulify the Supreme Court's standards governing requests for
equitable tolling of filing deadlines. See, e.g., Palacios v. Stephens, 723 F.3d 6oo, 6o6 (5th
Cir. 2013) (rejecting a proposed rulification of the equitable tolling standard on the ground
that it would "be in tension with ... the Supreme Court's recent guidance that equitable
tolling decisions 'must be made on a case-by-case basis'" (quoting Holland v. Florida, 130 S.
Ct. 2549, 2563 (2OO))); Pabon v. Mahoney, 654 F.3d 385, 399 (3d Cir. 2011) ("There are no
bright lines in determining whether equitable tolling is warranted in a given case. Rather,
the particular circumstances of each petitioner must be taken into account.").
82. 355 Fed. App'x 8oo (sth Cir. 2009).
83. Id. at 8o6 n.2; see also Lezcano-Bonilla v. Matos-Rodriguez, No. 07-1453, 2010 WL 3372514,
at *7 (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010) ("Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997), 'rejected a cate-
gorical rule imposing constitutional due process requirements on suspensions without pay.'
Accordingly, this Circuit has rejected the notion that due process always requires a predepri-
vation hearing." (quoting Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003))).
84. Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9 th Cir. 2013).
85. Steinert v. Winn Grp. Inc., 44o F.3d 1214, 1222 (loth Cir. 2006).
86. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (20o6).
87. 689 F.3d 1138, 1143-45 (loth Cir. 2012).
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to the district court's granting of such relief.88 But by issuing such a rule, the
district court had ignored the fact that "[t]he Supreme Court has rejected the
application of categorical rules in injunction cases." s 9 eBay's anti-rulification
rule, in other words, helped to bolster the court's conclusion that "categorical
relief is beyond the reach of the courts' equitable powers." 90 Rather than issue
a rule applicable to all consumers in all TILA cases, the district court should
have "weigh[ed] the case-specific equities in favor of both parties and the pub-
lic interest."9'
Case law involving both the Patent Act's "obviousness" standard and the
Copyright Act's fair-use defense also provides examples of lower courts' adher-
ence to the Supreme Court's anti-rulification rules. The Federal Circuit recent-
ly rejected an inventor's claim of nonobviousness as incorrectly premised on a
"restrictive view" that would "present a rigid test" for obviousness, in violation
of the Supreme Court's command that "[t]he obviousness analysis cannot be
confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and
motivation."92 Similarly, the Second Circuit has refused to adopt a rule under
which a defendant's bad-faith appropriation of copyright material would be
88. Id. at 1143.
89. Id. at 1144 (quoting RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegel, 552 F.3d 1203, 1210 (loth Cir. 2009)).
go. Id. at 1143-44.
91. Id. at 1144. A related set of cases involves the so-called "presumption of irreparable harm" in
patent and copyright cases, which, prior to eBay, many lower courts had routinely applied in
connection with requests for injunctive relief. Although "[t]he Supreme Court [in eBay] ...
did not expressly address the presumption of irreparable harm," Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon
Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2011), at least three courts of appeals have since
jettisoned the presumption as inconsistent with eBay's rule against rulification, see, e.g., Per-
fect io, Inc. v. Google Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 981 (9 th Cir. 2011) (characterizing the presump-
tion as "clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning" of the Court's decision in eBay (quoting
Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc))); Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at
1148; Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 76-78 (2d Cir. 2oo). eBay, the Federal Circuit has
explained, made clear that "'broad classifications' and 'categorical rule[s]' have no place in
this inquiry," meaning that plaintiffs "can no longer rely on presumptions or other short-
cuts to support a request for a permanent injunction." Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1148-49 (al-
teration in original) (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 393). Put another way, eBay "warned against
reliance on presumptions or categorical rules," meaning that "the propriety of injunctive re-
lief" in patent and copyright cases "must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in accord with
traditional equitable principles and without the aid of presumptions or a 'thumb on the
scale' in favor of issuing such relief." Perfect lo, 653 F.3d at 979-81 (quoting Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2757 (2010)).
92. Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, lOO8 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007)).
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"dispositive of a fair use defense," 3 citing the Supreme Court's "warning
against the application of 'bright-line rules' in fair use analysis."94
Finally, in Quebedeaux v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims con-
fronted a takings claim arising from government-induced flooding of private
land.9" In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, recall, the Court had refused to
hold that temporary floodings of land fell categorically beyond the scope of the
Takings Clause, holding instead that the takings analysis required "reference to
the 'particular circumstances of each case.' ' 6 Quebedeaux, by contrast, raised
the question of how frequent such floodings needed to be in order to implicate
the Fifth Amendment's just-compensation requirement. The government had
asked the lower court to adopt a "bright-line rule" according to which "a single
flooding event may not give rise to a takings," but the lower court rejected this
approach as inconsistent with the "multi-factored, factually-intensive nature of
the takings analysis."9 7 Instead, the court held, the inquiry "require[d] an ex-
amination of multiple factors, certainly beyond whether actual flooding has oc-
curred once, twice, or even a dozen times. "9'
93. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F. 3d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 2004).
94. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 51o U.S. 569, 578 (1994)); see also Blanch
v. Koons, 467 F. 3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 20o6) ("[T]he determination of fair use is an open-
ended and context-sensitive inquiry. In Campbell, the Supreme Court warned that the task
'is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes,
calls for case-by-case analysis.'" (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78)); Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257, 1279 (iith Cir. 2aOO) (Marcus, J., concurring) ("Fair
use adjudication requires case-by-case analysis and eschews bright-line rules." (citing
Campbell, 51o U.S. at 577)); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 1o9 F.3d 1394,
140o n.6 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The district court concluded that Penguin and Dove may not
employ the four-factor fair use analysis if the infringing work is not a parody. The applica-
tion of this presumption is in error. The Supreme Court has thus far eschewed bright line
rules, favoring a case-by-case balancing."); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 151o,
1520 ( 9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to recognize a "per se right to disassemble object code" in
light of the "case-by-case" and "equitable" nature of fair use analysis (emphasis omitted)).
For examples from the patent law context, see Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F. 3d
1363, 1374 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2o08) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 419), in which the court stated that
it was "mindful that in KSR, the Supreme Court made clear that a finding of teaching, sug-
gestion, or motivation to combine is not a 'rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry"';
and Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp., 550 F.3d 1112, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 20o8), in which the court
found that the lower court's jury instructions did not violate the Supreme Court's methodo-
logical instructions regarding the TSM principle because the court described the principle in
"unrigid terms."
95. 112 Fed. Cl. 317 (2013).
96. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 521 (2012) (quoting United States
v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
97. Quebedeaux, 112 Fed. Cl. at 321,323-24.
98. Id. at 324.
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These examples highlight the breadth of anti-rulification rules. In none of
these cases did lower courts reject rulifications identical to ones that the Su-
preme Court had previously rejected. Instead, lower courts rejected rulifica-
tions that the Court had never before considered. They did so because they
read the applicable Supreme Court precedents to establish not just a substan-
tive prohibition on the use of one particular rulification of a standard but also a
methodological prohibition on any and all attempts to apply the standard in
rule-like terms. It was, in other words, the act of formulating a standard in
rule-like terms, rather than any one particular formulation, that the lower
courts deemed off-limits. In that sense, they were taking both substantive and
methodological guidance from the Supreme Court's rules against rulification.
C. The Alternative Approach
By now, the reader may be thinking: "Wait a minute! These examples
stand for only the unremarkable proposition that the Supreme Court some-
times adopts standards. That's hardly worth writing home about, much less in
law-review-article form." 99 But the rejoinder to that argument has already been
advanced: as Part I made clear, a standard accompanied by an anti-rulification
rule (what I have called a "mandatory standard") is not the same thing as a
standard standing alone (what I have called a "permissive standard"). I have
already offered conceptual support for that point, but let me briefly offer a few
concrete examples of permissive standards at work.
One permissive standard resides within Miranda doctrine. Although the
Miranda warning itself reflects a bright-line rule, courts must still determine
when such warnings are necessary. Here, the Supreme Court's guidance has
taken on a more standard-like character. Specifically, the Court has explained
that Miranda applies once an interaction between law enforcement and an indi-
vidual takes the form of a "custodial interrogation." ' What counts as a custo-
dial interrogation? While the Court has offered some guidance on this point, it
has largely delegated the development of governing law to the lower courts."'
This move, in turn, has led some courts to rulify important aspects of their
9g. The reader may also be thinking that even if mandatory standards are meaningfully differ-
ent from permissive standards, the choice between mandatory and permissive standards im-
plicates the same basic set of considerations as does the first-order choice between rules and
standards. I take up that set of concerns in the next Part.
woo. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,428 (1984).
101. On one point, the Court has been clear: the determination must be based on the "objective
circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the inter-




doctrine concerning the scope of custodial interrogations. The Third Circuit,
for instance, has stipulated that admissibility-related questioning of individuals
at border checkpoints qualifies as per se noncustodial for Miranda purposes. °2
Relatedly, several circuits have ruled that valid Terry stops do not normally
give rise to custodial circumstances. °3 Until recently, the Sixth Circuit had ap-
plied a "bright-line test" to cases involving in-prison interrogations, according
to which Miranda warnings "must be given when an inmate is isolated from
the general prison population and interrogated about conduct occurring out-
side of the prison.' 0 4 Moreover, the Court itself has deemed questioning pur-
102. United States v. Kiam, 432 F. 3d 524, 530 (3 d Cir. 2005) ("[T]here is not likely to be the 're-
straint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest' in normal
immigration practice, where questioning and delay is the norm. This is the only possible
'line' which sufficiently reflects the deference due inspectors at the border of the United
States.") (citation omitted) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per
curiam)). For a different, more standard-oriented approach, see United States v. FNU LNU,
653 F. 3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that "the inquiry remains a holistic one in which the
nature and context of the questions asked, together with the nature and degree of restraints
placed on the person questioned, are relevant").
103. See, e.g., United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2001) ("As a general rule, Terry
stops do not implicate the requirements of Miranda ...." (quoting United States v. Streifel,
781 F.2d 953, 958 (lst Cir. 1986))); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (loth Cir.
1993) ("The traditional view.., is that Miranda warnings are simply not implicated in the
context of a valid Terry stop. This view has prevailed because the typical police-citizen en-
counter envisioned by the Court in Terry usually involves no more than a very brief deten-
tion without the aid of weapons or handcuffs, a few questions relating to identity and the
suspicious circumstances, and an atmosphere that is 'substantially less "police dominated"
than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda.'" (citations omitted));
United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9 th Cir. 1982) ("Terry stops, though inher-
ently somewhat coercive, do not usually involve the type of police dominated or compelling
atmosphere which necessitates Miranda warnings.").
104. Fields v. Howes, 617 F.3d 813, 822 (6th Cir. 2010). The test was recently rejected by the Su-
preme Court, though not in a manner suggesting that any and all bright-line rules must be
discarded for purposes of distinguishing between custodial and noncustodial interrogations.
Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012). To be sure, the Court did suggest that "the determi-
nation of custody should focus on all of the features of the interrogation." Id. at 1192. But
that language comes alongside other suggestions in the opinion that the Sixth Circuit had
erred only with respect to the particular bright-line rule it had adopted. See, e.g., id. at 1185
("[T] he rule applied by the court below does not represent a correct interpretation of our Mi-
randa case law." (emphasis added)); id. at 1187 ("[W]e have repeatedly declined to adopt
any categorical rule with respect to whether the questioning of a prison inmate is custodial." (em-
phasis added)); id. at 1189 ("The three elements of that rule... are not necessarily enough
to create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes."). I am therefore inclined to read the
case as setting forth only the relatively narrow principle that a per se custody rule is inap-
propriate as applied to prison interrogations, while leaving open the possibility that other
per se rules (either for or against Miranda warnings) make sense with respect to other types
of "custody" claims.
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suant to "ordinary traffic stops" to be noncustodial.'0 s These rulifications of
Miranda's definition of "custody" remain good law today, notwithstanding the
fact that Miranda originally defined Miranda's applicability in the form of a
standard rather than a rule.
A second example involves the identification of circumstances triggering
application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In a series of cases be-
ginning with Massiah v. United States, the Supreme Court has held that the
right to counsel prohibits "government agents" from covertly eliciting testimo-
ny from a defendant in the absence of counsel once a criminal prosecution has
begun. ' 6 Yet the Court has offered little guidance as to who counts as a gov-
ernment agent for Massiah purposes °7-what to do, for instance, about gov-
ernment informants acting on their own initiative? -and the lower courts have
hazarded different means of answering the question for themselves. Some cir-
cuits have applied a "bright-line rule," under which an individual becomes a
"government agent" only when "instructed by the police to get information
about the particular defendant. "1o8 Other circuits, by contrast, use a standard-
based approach, identifying Massiah-worthy government agents by reference
to the "facts and circumstances" of each case.' 9 Therefore, by allowing lower
courts to choose between rules and standards to facilitate their application of
the "government agent" test, Massiah appears to have left a permissive stand-
ard in its wake-one as to which further rulification is neither prohibited nor
required.
1os. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (1984).
106. 377 U.S. 201, 206-07 (1964); see also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (198o) ("The
question here is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent deliberately elicited
incriminating statements . . . within the meaning of Massiah." (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
107. Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 893 (3d Cit. 1999) ("The Supreme Court has not
formally defined the term 'government agent' for Sixth Amendment purposes.").
io8. Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d
342, 346 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir. 2010) (charac-
terizing this approach as "a bright line nile").
log. Ayers, 623 F.3d at 311 (noting that several circuits have endorsed the view that "'[t] here is, by
necessity, no bright-line rule for determining whether an individual is a government agent
for purposes of the sixth amendment right to counsel. The answer depends on the 'facts and
circumstances' of each case." (alteration in original) (quoting Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d
784, 793-94 (ilth Cir. 1991))); Matteo, 171 F.3d at 9o6 (McKee, J., concurring) ("[T]he infi-
nite number of ways that investigators and informants can combine to elicit information
from an unsuspecting defendant precludes us from establishing any litmus test for deter-
mining when an informant is acting as a government agent under Massiah.").
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One further example comes from administrative law. In United States v.
Mead Corp.,"' the Supreme Court expounded on its holding in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,"' which set forth the basic
framework for reviewing agencies' interpretations of their enabling statutes."2
Specifically, Mead held that Chevron deference applies only when an agency has
exercised validly delegated powers to act with "the force of law."'13 When, in
contrast, the agency does not so act, courts must apply the somewhat less def-
erential (and more open-ended) framework of Skidmore v. Swift & Co."' This
distinction- between agency actions that do and do not "carry the force of
law" -drew immediate criticism from Justice Scalia, who, dissenting in Mead,
attacked the standard as hopelessly vague."' In a subsequent analysis of the de-
cision, however, Thomas Merrill argued persuasively that the lack of clarity in
Mead's force of law requirement was hardly a harbinger of doctrinal doom. In
his view, "nothing the Court did or said [in Mead] precludes future decisions
that brush away the fuzziness in the majority's exposition, leaving us with a
clear and defensible meta-rule" for determining when Chevron applies., 6 Put
another way, as substantively vague as the force of law requirement might have
seemed, the Court had not prescribed along with it a hard-and-fast rule against
rulification. So Justice Scalia's concerns about doctrinal vagueness were in fact
overstated, as both the Supreme Court and lower courts remained free to create
sharp-edged rulifications of Mead's open-ended "force of law" requirement.
110. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
111. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
112. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005)
("Chevron established a familiar two-step procedure for evaluating whether an agency's in-
terpretation of a statute is lawful.").
113. Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.
114. 323 U.S. 134 (944); see also Hagans v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 294-95 (3d Cir.
2012) ("Where Chevron deference is inappropriate, a court may instead apply a lesser degree
of deference pursuant to Skidmore v. Swift & Co."). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the
Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011) (suggest-
ing, on the basis of several empirical studies, that "a court's choice of which doctrine to ap-
ply in reviewing agency action is not an important determinant of outcomes in the Supreme
Court or the circuit courts").
11s. Mead, 533 U.S. at 245-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the
Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 356 (2003) ("[J]t is a valid, if rather obvious, objection
to Mead that it overvalues the decisional benefits of standards and undervalues the decision-
al benefits of rules.").
116. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-
Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 807, 833-34 (2002). Merrill calls the "force-of-law" requirement
a "meta-standard," in the sense that it governs the first-order choice between applying the
relatively "rule-like" framework of Chevron and the more "standard-like" framework of
Skidmore.
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Merrill emphasized the rulifying potential of the Supreme Court itself, ra-
ther than the circuit courts tasked with applying the "meta-standard" of Mead
in the mine run of cases. 7 But there is no reason why lower courts cannot start
"brush[ing] away the fuzziness" for themselves while awaiting further guid-
ance from above. And indeed, lower courts have attempted to do just that.
Building on a suggestion offered in Mead itself,"uS most courts have held that
legislative rules enacted pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures are pre-
sumptively entitled to Chevron deference, thus establishing a safe harbor for
agencies that want to ensure deferential review of the interpretations they have
propounded." 9 Furthermore, various lower courts have set forth rules of their
own concerning more specific categories of agency action -holding, for in-
stance, that Chevron deference generally applies to positions embraced in
Treasury Department regulations,'20 FEC advisory opinions,' and preceden-
tial opinions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)," and that Skidmore
deference generally applies to positions set forth in IRS Revenue Rulings," 3
117. Id. at 821 ("As the Court gradually decides cases in these intermediate areas, it should even-
tually transform the meta-standard into something more like a complex meta-rule, thereby
reducing lower court discretion.").
118. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 ("We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting
Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rule-
making or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is
claimed.").
119. See, e.g., BCCA Appeal Grp. v. EPA, 355 F.3d 817, 825 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Because notice-and-
comment rulemaking is a formal process, EPA's final rules ... will be afforded Chevron def-
erence."); U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F. 3 d 1137, 1141 (7 th Cir. 2001) ("After
Mead, we know that we give full deference under [Chevron] only to regulations that were
promulgated with full notice-and-comment or comparable formalities.").
i2o. Mayo Found. v. United States, 568 F. 3d 675 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Treasury Regulations inter-
preting the Internal Revenue Code are entitled to substantial deference."), affd, 131 S. Ct.
703, 714 (2011) ("The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in
the tax context."); see also Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REv.
465, 468-69 (2013) (noting that while the "Mayo Court declared clearly and unequivocally
that Treasury regulations promulgated using notice-and-comment rulemaking carry the
force of law for the purpose of Mead and Chevron," the case law remains "mixed" on the
question of whether Chevron deference should apply to "temporary" and "interpretative"
Treasury regulations that are promulgated without notice and comment).
121. FEC v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., 254 F.3 d 173, 185 (D.C. Cit. 2007).
122. Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F. 3d 903, 909 (9 th Cir. 2009) ("[W]e have held that the
Board's precedential orders, which bind third parties, qualify for Chevron deference because
they are made with a 'lawmaking pretense.').
123. See, e.g., Komman & Assocs. v. United States, 527 F. 3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 2008) ("After care-




agencies' amicus briefs, 4 and non-precedential opinions of the BIA.'2 s None of
this is to say that lower courts have no right to express confusion and frustra-
tion as to precisely what Mead and its progeny have instructed them to do.
2 6
But it is to say that the Court has afforded lower courts a means of mitigating
the confusion by permitting them to rulify the standards that Mead and subse-
quent cases have set forth."2 7 That option would not have been available to the
lower courts if Mead had stipulated that downstream appliers of the force of
124. See, e.g., Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2001)
("Upon reading Mead, we find that a litigation position in an amicus brief, perhaps just as
agency interpretations of statutes contained in formats such as opinion letters, policy state-
ments, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, are entitled to respect only to the ex-
tent that those interpretations have the power to persuade pursuant to Skidmore." (internal
citations omitted)).
125. Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 909 ("We have not accorded Chevron deference to the
Board's unpublished decisions ... because they do not bind future parties."). For a more de-
tailed list of lower court decisions regarding the applicability (or non-applicability) of Chev-
ron deference across a wide variety of different agency actions, see Lisa Schultz Bressman,
How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1458 n.iol
(2005).
126. Much fuzziness still remains in the post-Mead case law, though not for reasons having to do
with the vagueness of the "force of law" requirement itself. Instead, the central cause of low-
er courts' difficulties, as Lisa Schultz Bressman has shown, is the Court's subsequent deci-
sion in Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). See Bressman, supra note 125, at 1445-46.
Barnhart, as Bressman shows, embraced sub silentio a seemingly distinct formulation of
"Chevron Step Zero," without making clear how to reconcile its own test for Chevron eligibil-
ity with the "force of law" test that Mead had previously established. See id. at 1464 (noting
that "[t]he Supreme Court has not clarified the relationship between the two decisions").
The upshot is that, when deciding whether to apply Chevron, some courts "consider Mead-
inspired factors," others consider "Barnhart-inspired" factors, and very few courts
"acknowledge that they have chosen one [test] over another." Id. at 1459.
Such confusion, to be clear, may represent a serious doctrinal problem, worthy of fur-
ther attention from commentators and the Court itself. But the problem should not be
blamed on the open-ended nature of the "force-of-law" criterion that Mead set forth. The
culprit, instead, is Barnhart, and its seemingly mixed signals regarding the ongoing validity
of Mead. Consequently, the lower court confusion that Bressman has identified should not
count as evidence against the clarifying potential of permissive standards: when Mead came
down, one could reasonably have thought that the case's formulation of "Chevron Step Zero"
could be easily clarified -via subsequent rulification of the permissive standard it embraced.
Had Mead set forth a mandatory standard, by contrast, the hopes for reduced fuzziness go-
ing forward would have been considerably reduced.
127. Such an interim arrangement might fail to yield uniform treatments of Mead among the
U.S. Courts of Appeals - a non-ideal outcome from the perspective of Justice Scalia and oth-
er firm proponents of rules. Still, within the circuits themselves, the opinion certainly does
not preclude courts from defining with greater precision when and how the "force-of-law"
criterion applies, and that in turn should enhance the clarity of the doctrine that they em-
ploy.
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law test were required to adjudge its applicability on a "case-by-case" basis, by
reference only to the "totality of the circumstances" accompanying each indi-
vidual agency action. 128 But Mead said nothing of the sort; it simply adopted an
open-ended standard without placing limits on lower courts' ability to specify
the content of that standard over time.
III. THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES
To recap, standards laid down by the Supreme Court may operate in one of
two ways. If such standards are accompanied by rules against rulification (op-
erating as what I have called "mandatory standards"), then lower courts may
not develop specific rules regarding the application of these standards in future
cases. If substantive standards are not accompanied by rules against rulification
(operating as what I have called "permissive standards"), then lower courts
may freely choose to rulify or not to rulify such standards as they see fit. The
analysis thus far has attempted to establish both the conceptual validity and
doctrinal reality of rules against rulification. But it still remains to be asked:
what exactly is at stake here? Why, in other words, does it matter whether the
lower courts are barred from rulifying a standard, and what consequences, if
any, are likely to follow from the Supreme Court's commands to that effect?
This Part addresses those questions. They are important questions to ad-
dress because it is only by understanding the consequences of anti-rulification
rules that we can develop a framework for evaluating them: we need to know
how rules against rulification affect the doctrine in order to know whether and,
if so, when they should be incorporated into it. And, as this Part suggests, rules
against rulification do in fact carry several significant consequences for the sub-
stantive standards to which they attach. Across a wide range of substantive
contexts, anti-rulification rules achieve at least five important doctrinal results,
some positive, some negative, and some whose desirability will vary from case
to case. Specifically, rules against rulification will tend to (i) mitigate problems
of fit; (2) discourage forms of substantive and methodological experimenta-
tion; (3) increase the decisional autonomy of trial court actors vis-a-vis inter-
128. Justice Scalia's dissent in Mead characterized the majority as adopting the "test most beloved
by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to know
what to expect): th'ol' 'totality of the circumstances' test." Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). This characterization, however, is accurate only insofar as it suggests that the
majority itself looked to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the agency
action before it carried the force of law. The characterization was inaccurate, however, to the
extent it implied that the majority had imposed on lower courts the obligation to analyze the




mediate court supervisors; (4) reduce judicial transparency; and (5) promote
apparent, but not actual, uniformity within the law. The ensuing discussion
describes these effects, while offering some tentative normative conclusions as
to how they might influence the Court's evaluation of anti-rulification rules
across a range of different cases.
Throughout this discussion, my focus is not on the first-order choice be-
tween rules and standards writ large. 2 9 My inquiry, by contrast, begins where
that first-order choice has ended. The relevant point of comparison is not be-
tween mandatory standards and first-order rules, but rather between mandato-
ry standards on the one hand and permissive standards on the other. Put an-
other way, I omit discussion of the obvious conclusion that standards accom-
accompanied by rules against rulification will generate outcomes quite different
from what first-order rules would have produced. Instead, the analysis as-
sumes that a substantive standard is already in place and looks only to the
question of how the presence or absence of an anti-rulification rule will affect
the standard's operation going forward.
A. Fit
A virtue of standards-and a corresponding vice of rules-relates to the
minimization of over- and under-inclusiveness problems. Rules, but not
standards, allow judges to tailor their holdings closely to the underlying facts
of a case. Consequently, rules are more likely than standards to yield individual
outcomes that seem obtuse, unfair, or otherwise contrary to the "spirit" of the
doctrinal inquiry being conducted. But the fit-related benefits of a standard are
not guaranteed to last forever. Lower courts might eventually develop rulifica-
tions of that standard, and these rulifications will in turn generate over- and
under-inclusiveness problems of the sort that the original standard had man-
aged to avoid.
When a rule against rulification enters the picture, the fit-related benefits
of a substantive standard become more likely to endure over time. The whole
point of the anti-rulification rule is to foreclose lower court reliance on catego-
rizations, presumptions, and other decision-making "short-cuts" as substitutes
for holistic, case-by-case application of the standard itself. All else equal, free-
wheeling application of an open-ended standard will produce fewer outcomes
that seem obviously contrary to or inconsistent with a standard's animating
purposes, at least as compared to the alternative of strictly adhering to rules. If,
for instance, the relevant standard prohibits "unreasonable driving," and lower
ug. The various consequences flowing from that choice have been exhaustively analyzed else-
where. See sources cited supra note 19.
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courts apply the standard without reliance on ancillary rules, then driving will
tend to qualify as "unreasonable" where it really does strike those courts as un-
reasonable. But if lower courts proceed to rulify the "unreasonable driving"
standard- by stipulating, for instance, that driving over seventy miles per hour
is per se unreasonable -then some acts of driving would count as "unreasona-
ble" even when circumstances strongly favored a finding to the contrary. (Con-
sider, for instance, the example of a physician driving eighty-five miles per
hour on the way to a medical emergency.) Standing alone, a standard cannot
prevent these latter sorts of outcomes from arising. But standing next to a rule
against rulification, a standard most certainly can.
The Court's opinion in Florida v. Harris helps to illustrate this point. The
Court openly worried that the Florida Supreme Court's "checklist" approach to
probable cause review would sometimes generate crude and seemingly arbi-
trary results -leading Florida courts to find (or not find) probable cause when
common sense and intuition would have suggested otherwise. 3' Simply reiter-
ating the content of Illinois v. Gates's substantive standard,"' however, was not
enough to foreclose similar results in future cases. Open-ended as that stand-
ard purported to be, problems of fit remained a threat as long as lower courts
could develop their own rules to govern Gates's application to different catego-
ries of cases. Hence the Court took pains in Harris to establish not just that the
Florida court's probable cause finding was substantively erroneous, but also
that the finding rested on an impermissible attempt to embed within Gates's
framework a detailed set of rules. It is this latter component of the holding in
Harris, far more than the open-ended nature of the Gates test itself, that offers
the strongest safeguard against over- and under-inclusiveness problems in fu-
ture probable cause cases.'32
130. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1052 (2013) (noting that under the Florida court's ap-
proach, "[n]o matter how much other proof the State offers of the dog's reliability, the ab-
sent field performance records will preclude a finding of probable cause").
131. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
132. Harris reveals another important point about fit-related values. Saying that anti-rulification
rules mitigate problems of fit is different from saying that such rules are a boon to individu-
al rights. Sometimes, to be sure, anti-rulification rules will promote liberty interests in an
obvious way. (Recall, for instance, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 511 (2012), where the Court invoked a rule against rulification in reversing a lower
court's holding that temporary floodings could never constitute a taking of property; there,
the anti-rulification rule eliminated a prior holding that Takings Clause claimants would
have systematically disfavored.) But anti-rulification rules are just as capable of generating
(and have in fact generated) results in the other direction, invalidating rulifications of
standards that might otherwise have benefited rights-based claimants. That was true in
Harris, for example. The anti-rulification rule adopted there resulted in a more government-
friendly probable cause standard than the Florida courts would have otherwise applied. And
the point rings true in many other cases. The anti-rulification rule that accompanies the
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At its core, then, the relationship between fit-related values and rules
against rulification is simple. Standards, as compared to rules, promote close-
ness of fit; consequently, anti-rulification rules-which help to preserve a
standard's open-ended character- amplify the standard's fit-promoting effects.
When the Court regards closeness of fit as a paramount doctrinal priority, rules
against rulification will serve its purposes well. To put the point somewhat dif-
ferently, if the first-order choice of a standard over a rule stems primarily from
the Court's desire to minimize problems of over- and under-inclusiveness in
the application of law to fact, then the Court will have good reason to bolster
the standard with an anti-rulification rule.
This motivation, however, will not always be at work. As the next few sec-
tions reveal, standards sometimes reflect more than just a single-minded judi-
cial desire to ensure closeness of fit. Where alternative motivations are in play,
assessing the value of a rule against rulification becomes a more complicated
endeavor, as fit-promoting benefits must be considered alongside a variety of
other doctrinal effects.
B. Experimentation
Lower courts, unlike the Supreme Court, are categorically bound by Su-
preme Court precedents. According to well-established principles of vertical
stare decisis, lower courts cannot set aside Supreme Court rulings that they re-
gard as counterproductive or unwise. Even faced with such strict precedential
constraints, however, lower courts make their own independent contributions
to the Supreme Court's work. They apply existing Supreme Court law to new
and unforeseen fact patterns and, in so doing, provide a substantial infor-
mation base for the Court to consider when contemplating further doctrinal
reforms. By resolving the lion's share of cases that arise under the Supreme
Court's precedents, lower courts attempt to make sense of these precedents in a
variety of ways. When the time later comes for the Court to update these prec-
Strickland standard, for instance, has prohibited some lower courts from imposing on de-
fense counsel a per se duty to investigate potential mitigation defenses - a duty that, all else
equal, would make the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel easier for
criminal defendants to invoke. Striving for closeness of fit, in short, is different from striv-
ing for the maximization of liberty; it is the former objective and not the latter that anti-
rulification rules seem inherently well suited to achieve.
Theoretically, the Court could adopt an anti-rulification rule that ran only in one direc-
tion -holding, for instance, that lower courts are free to develop categorical "safe harbor"
provisions that benefit rights-based claimants, while still insisting that any denial of rights-
based claims be defended by reference to the totality of the circumstances. I am not aware of
any doctrines that operate in this way, but it strikes me as a possibility worth further consid-
eration.
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edents, the lower courts' body of work can valuably inform the Court's deci-
sion regarding which way to go.
Acknowledging the lower courts' role in the development of doctrinal rules,
the Supreme Court has often recognized the value of letting a legal issue "per-
colate" below before stepping in to provide a definitive resolution from above.
The rationale most often surfaces in connection with denials of certiorari, with
the Justices declining review of a disputed legal issue for the sake of affording
lower courts more time to grapple with its intricacies. 33 Analogous logic could
prompt the Court to decide, after granting certiorari, that an issue is better re-
solved by means of a standard rather than a rule. A standard-like formulation
of a Supreme Court holding will "decide less" than a rule-like formulation,
thereby providing lower courts with a greater degree of freedom to continue
experimenting with the substance of the doctrine under review.134 To take a
133. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("We have in
many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, periods of 'per-
colation' in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts may yield a better
informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court."); McCray v. New York,
461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of petitions for writs of certiorari)
(explaining vote to deny certiorari on the ground that "it is a sound exercise of discretion for
the Court to allow the various States to serve as laboratories in which the issue receives fur-
ther study before it is addressed by this Court"). An especially helpful analysis of the "perco-
lation" rationale is provided by Doni Gewirtzman. See Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Con-
stitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REv. 457,
481-5ol (2012) ("Among other things, a robust percolation process allows the Court to use
its limited monitoring resources more efficiently, minimizes the Court's expenditures of po-
litical capital, incentivizes lower court judges to take their job more seriously, and lets the
Court measure support for a potential ruling among lower court judges, who are ultimately
charged with applying the rule and whose allegiance is necessary for the Court to enforce its
will.").
134. Why, one might ask, would a Court considering a case on the merits ever continue to care
about lower court percolation? After all, wouldn't the earlier decision to grant certiorari re-
veal that the Court has already adjudged that further percolation on the issue would offer
little additional value? That might well be true in some cases, but it is not difficult to imag-
ine other cases that are cert-worthy while still presenting issues worthy of further percola-
tion. Perhaps, for instance, the Court has granted certiorari in a case for the purpose of rul-
ing out one particular approach to a legal question as obviously deficient. Having done so,
the Court could still logically conclude that further percolation might assist in identifying
the "correct" approach to that issue. Perhaps a case contains an obviously cert-worthy issue
that is reachable only through the resolution of other, less cert-worthy threshold issues. Or
perhaps the Court granted certiorari because it regarded a particular dispute as especially im-
portant- think of United States v. Nixon, New York Times Co. v. United States, or perhaps
Bush v. Gore-even while acknowledging that the abstract legal questions presented by the
dispute might continue to benefit from additional lower court input and experimentation.
In these and other scenarios, percolation values might justifiably push the Court toward ar-
ticulating its holding in standard-like terms, even if the case presenting the issue warrants
immediate attention from the Court.
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simple example, the holding that a driver broke the law because he drove "un-
reasonably" settles far less than the holding that the driver broke the law be-
cause (and only because) his speed exceeded sixty-five miles per hour. With
the latter holding on the books, there remains little left for lower courts to do
aside from asking whether each individual did or did not exceed the sixty-five
miles per hour threshold. With the former holding, by contrast, lower courts
would still need to grapple with the meaning of the Court's "reasonableness"
requirement and the many potential rulifications that might flow from it. The
lower courts would consider difficult cases at the margins of reasonable driving
and, in so doing, identify a more specific set of conditions under which reason-
ableness might or might not be shown. (For example, the lower courts might
hold that driving under the influence is always unreasonable, that driving
while talking on a cellphone is always unreasonable except when the phone call
involves an emergency, and so on.) Eventually, these courts' work might pro-
vide the basis for better-informed, down-the-road specifications of the stand-
ard by the Supreme Court itself.
But when a rule against rulification accompanies the standard, lower courts
will enjoy fewer opportunities to tinker with the doctrine. Most obviously,
lower courts will no longer have occasion to ask whether rulification of the
standard is warranted under all, some, or no circumstances. A permissive
standard allows (but does not require) lower courts to rulify certain aspects of
the doctrine being applied. But a mandatory standard forecloses that possibility
altogether. To the extent, then, that the Court remains interested in rulifying
the standard in a later case, a permissive standard seems better suited to pro-
mote further study of the issue. Unrestrained by the methodological dictates of
an anti-rulification rule, lower courts might generate opinions that explain why
rulification of the standard might be useful, why it might be counterproduc-
tive, or why the question presents a close call. What is more, the lower courts
opting to rulify the standard would further confront the question of how to
translate the standard into a rule and in so doing embrace different rule-like
formulations of the standard itself. All of this work at the lower court level
would thereby generate useful data for the Supreme Court to consider when
revisiting the doctrine in a future case.13
135. To see all these points more concretely, suppose that the Court one day confronts a Massiah
claim arising from a government informant's acquisition of information from a criminal de-
fendant. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Current Supreme Court case law
leaves it unclear how to determine whether the informant in question qualifies as the sort of
"government agent" necessary to trigger application of Massiah's recognized protections. See
supra notes 1o5-1o8 and accompanying text. Happily for the Court, however, the Federal
Reporter now relates a variety of attempted means of attacking this problem -some more
rule-like than others -along with discussions of these methods' respective tradeoffs. This
useful information has materialized thanks largely to the lack of an anti-rulification rule
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Rules against rulification also disserve the "percolation" process in a subtler
way- namely, by discouraging forward-looking deliberation about the system-
wide problems implicated by a given doctrinal regime. Harris once again
proves instructive. In setting forth the "strict evidentiary checklist" that the
Supreme Court rejected, the Florida Supreme Court had sought to shed light
on a set of recurring problems presented by canine searches within the state of
Florida. , 6 The state court had expressed concern, for instance, about the ab-
sence of a uniform certification standard for drug-sniffing dogs, inadequate
record-keeping procedures regarding the success rates of their searches, and-
to the extent that such records existed- defendants' difficulties in obtaining
them. 37 One likely effect of the Harris decision will be to render ruminations of
governing Massiah "government agent" determinations. Had the lower courts been operat-
ing under strict instructions to apply a highly contextualized, fact-specific approach to de-
termining whether an individual qualifies as a "government agent," they would have lost the
opportunity to determine (a) whether such a fact-specific approach to the problem actually
made sense; and (b) if not, what sorts of rule-like approaches to identifying "government
agents" would have been effective alternatives. Should it always matter, for instance, wheth-
er the informant received explicit instructions from the government to acquire the infor-
mation in question? See, e.g., United States v. Birbal, 113 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[A]n
informant becomes a government agent.., only when the informant has been instructed by
the police to get information about the particular defendant.") (emphasis added). Even if
not a necessary condition for establishing a Massiah violation, should the presence of "direct
written or oral instructions by the State to a jailhouse informant" at least qualify as a suffi-
cient condition for the same? E.g., Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2010)
("Thus, we hold that although direct written or oral instructions by the State to a jailhouse
informant to obtain evidence from a defendant would be sufficient to demonstrate agency, it
is not the only relevant factor."). Might courts instead apply a multi-factored approach to
the inquiry, see, e.g., Wallace v. Price, 265 F. Supp. 2d 545, 565-66 (W.D. Pa. 2003), reflect-
ing "the infinite number of ways that investigators and informants can combine to elicit in-
formation"? Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 906 (3d Cir. 1999). In-
deed, the lower courts have pondered just those sorts of questions, creating a rich
precedential record for the Court to consult when it revisits these issues for itself.
136. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1o56.
137. Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 767-70 (Fla. 2011). To be sure, rules against rulification do not
categorically prevent lower courts from thinking about, or even writing about, the "big-
picture" dimensions of the individual cases they confront. A court might apply a totality of
the circumstances test to the facts of a case, while then explaining in dicta why the facts of
the case reflect a troubling trend within its jurisdiction or even nationwide. My point is that
rules against rulification will reduce the need for deliberation of this sort and thereby re-
duce - at least at the margin- the likelihood that the deliberation will occur. It is in the con-
text of fashioning rules for a broad category of cases that courts are most likely to view the
cases as a category, with due attention to the recurring patterns and problems that they re-
flect. But when the Supreme Court has instructed the lower courts to take each individual
case on its own individual terms, the lower courts are more likely to stay focused on the




this sort less common in future sniff-search cases,3' shielding potentially im-
portant regulatory dimensions of the problem from meaningful analysis -both
in the courts below and, by extension, in the Supreme Court itself. 39
The upshot of all this is that anti-rulification rules will not always prove
helpful when the Court is operating under conditions of significant uncertain-
ty. Standards can accommodate this uncertainty nicely, by leaving lower courts
with ample flexibility to explore a variety of doctrinal specifications that a
standard does not explicitly foreclose. But this flexibility exists only as long as
the standard operates as a permissive one. A rule against rulification, by mak-
ing the standard mandatory, will close off much of this deliberative space, cur-
tailing lower-court opportunities to think about and experiment with compet-
ing approaches to a difficult doctrinal problem.
C. Delegation
A further effect of anti-rulification rules involves the allocation of authority
between trial-level and intermediate-level courts. Standards, unlike rules, carry
the consequence of devolving decision making downward. Rather than specify
what an operative norm does and does not permit, the enactor of a legal stand-
ard leaves such matters for lower-ranking actors to decide-via the repeated
resolution of cases arising under the standard's open-ended terms. As other
commentators have noted, the decision to adopt a standard is, in effect, a deci-
138. A moment's thought should reveal why this is so. By offering general observations regard-
ing system-wide problems with canine searches, a state supreme court cannot help but re-
duce the degree to which future in-state applications of the Gates test will involve a flexible
and all-things-considered analysis. By providing such observations, the state court is in ef-
fect tipping its hand as to the sorts of evidentiary deficiencies it will and will not deem prob-
lematic going forward. As a consequence, subordinate courts in Florida will have to keep
these generally applicable impressions in mind when deciding future cases- something that
the Supreme Court of the United States has now stipulated that they should not do. Thus, if
the Florida Supreme Court wishes to comply with Hanris's rule against rulification, it must
take care to confine its observations to the particular facts of each future sniff-search case
that it confronts.
139. That is not to say that rules against rulification discourage all meaningful forms of delibera-
tion. Indeed, anti-rulification rules-by inhibiting the development of rules- effectively
promote the forms of fact-sensitive deliberation that have long been associated with stand-
ards writ large. See Sullivan, supra note i9, at 67 ("The argument that rules desirably allo-
cate questions of substantive value away from judges toward the political branches has a
counterargument: rules favor the judicial abdication of responsibility, while standards make
the judge face up to his choices -he cannot absolve himself by saying 'sorry, my hands are
tied.' On this view, standards make visible and accountable the inevitable weighing process
that rules obscure."). My point, rather, is that this fact-specific form of deliberation comes at
the expense of meaningful "big-picture" deliberations about the law itself.
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sion to delegate, vesting lower-ranking actors with the ultimate authority to
dictate results in a wide range of cases. Justice Scalia has noted this point, ob-
serving that:
[W]hen we decide a case on the basis of what we have come to call the
"totality of the circumstances" test, it is not we who will be "closing in
on the law" in the foreseeable future, but rather thirteen different
courts of appeals- or, if it is a federal issue that can arise in state court
litigation as well, thirteen different courts of appeals and fifty state su-
preme courts. 40
Standards thus delegate authority downward. But this is not all there is to
the point, as the ultimate destination of the delegated authority will vary de-
pending on the presence of an anti-rulification rule. Permissive standards will
achieve the result that Justice Scalia predicts, vesting primary lawmaking au-
thority in intermediate-level courts of appeals. Mandatory standards, by con-
trast, will push the delegation all the way down to the bottom of the judicial
hierarchy, largely bypassing the intermediate courts on the way there.
Why is that so? The answer relates to the constraining effect of rules. Only
permissive standards empower intermediate courts (such as the thirteen circuit
courts or the fifty state supreme courts) to impose rules on the lower courts
they oversee. Mandatory standards, by contrast, prohibit the intermediate
courts from doing much more than affirming or reversing each trial court deci-
sion on the basis of a case's particular record. Anti-rulification rules, in other
words, substantially limit the amount of precedential guidance that intermedi-
ate courts can provide to the courts within their purview, thus giving bottom-
level courts (that is, federal district courts and state trial courts) freer rein to
apply Supreme Court standards according to their own best judgment. To be
sure, rules against rulification do not prevent intermediate courts from revers-
ing lower-level decisions that in their view misapply a governing standard. But
they do prevent intermediate courts from accompanying these reversals with
opinions that sweep far beyond the facts of each case. The precedential reach of
the intermediate court rulings must therefore remain narrow. And with inter-
mediate courts constrained in their ability to direct the efforts of subordinate
14o. Scalia, supra note 19, at 1179; see also Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of
Rules and Standards to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 515 (2012) (noting
that "higher courts use standards when they trust their lower court agents and rules when
they are less trustful" (citing Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political
Control, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 326, 333 (2007))).
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actors, the subordinate actors necessarily acquire increased control over the
standard's implementation. 4 '
That point perhaps helps to explain why anti-rulification rules sometimes
operate in tandem with deferential standards of appellate review. 42 Deferential
review standards, like rules against rulification, prevent intermediate courts
from circumscribing trial court discretion in the application of an open-ended
legal norm. Deferential review accomplishes this result in a retrospective man-
ner: it limits the extent to which reviewing courts can upset lower court judg-
ments that have already been rendered. Rules against rulification accomplish
the result prospectively: they limit the extent to which reviewing courts can
constrain trial courts' application of a standard by imposing rules for future
cases. Mandatory standards prevent reviewing courts from achieving in an ex
ante fashion the same sorts of incursions on trial court autonomy that deferen-
tial review standards aim to discourage ex post.
There remains a final difference between mandatory standards and permis-
sive standards in terms of their delegation-related effects. Mandatory stand-
ards, as we have seen, delegate decisional authority all the way to the bottom of
the legal hierarchy. Permissive standards, by contrast, delegate decisional au-
thority to intermediate courts. But notice that only permissive standards per-
mit the delegee to redelegate. From the Supreme Court's refusal to adopt an
anti-rulification rule, it does not follow that an intermediate court must assume
141. The delegation-related effects of rules against rulification suggest that the Court should de-
ploy these rules when it wishes to afford trial courts increased autonomy in applying law to
fact. Why, if ever, would the Court pursue that objective? One set of considerations relates
to the value of fit. When a given doctrinal test demands highly contextualized applications
of law, the Court might regard trial courts-that is, the ones that actually have done the
fact-finding work for themselves-as better situated than intermediate courts to generate
sensible and fact-sensitive outcomes. Ideological considerations might sometimes come into
play as well. When a single circuit court predominates within a particular subject area
(think, for instance, of the Federal Circuit and patent law or, to a lesser extent, the D.C. Cir-
cuit and administrative law), ideological tensions might sometimes prompt the Supreme
Court to use anti-rulification rules as a means of disempowering an adversary. I do not
know whether any of the examples I discussed in Part II owe their origin to ideologically
driven motivations. At least in theory, however, rules against rulification could be wielded
for such purposes -precisely because they enhance trial courts' autonomy vis-a-vis their ap-
pellate court overseers.
14a. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (20o6) (prohibiting rulifica-
tion of the traditional standard for issuing permanent injunctions, while also noting the
"'considerable discretion' district courts have 'in determining whether the facts of a situation
require it to issue an injunction'" (quoting Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d
858, 86S (Fed. Cir. 1984))); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (setting forth a man-
datory standard for a probable cause test while also emphasizing that "[a] magistrate's 'de-
termination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts'" (quoting
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969))).
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primary control over a standard's implementation. The intermediate court
might instead decide that the standard makes sense as articulated by the Su-
preme Court and that no further rulification is necessary. Having so decided,
the intermediate court would effectively delegate its own decisional authority
down to the courts below it. Rather than direct the lower courts in the form of
rule-like specifications of a standard, the intermediate court would instead let
the lower courts take up the laboring oar for themselves. Thus, while I earlier
noted that permissive standards transmit decisional authority to intermediate
courts, it is perhaps more accurate to say that permissive standards leave it up
to the intermediate courts to decide where in the judicial hierarchy such deci-
sional authority will reside. Mandatory standards, by contrast, deprive inter-
mediate courts of the ability to make that choice for themselves.
D. Uniformity
Anti-rulification rules also influence the uniformity of substantive law. At
first glance, the correlation seems to be a positive one. With a rule against ruli-
fication on the books, different courts may not develop different, non-uniform
rulifications of a single Supreme Court precedent. Instead, they must all apply
the precedent in the same, unrulified form that the Court originally prescribed.
That appears to be a uniform result, But in fact, the result fails to promote-
and may actually undermine - uniformity in another important sense.
This idea becomes clear if one draws a distinction between "norm uni-
formity," on the one hand, and "outcome uniformity," on the other. Norm uni-
formity manifests itself when different courts apply the same doctrinal norms
across similar cases; outcome uniformity manifests itself when applications of
those norms in fact produce similar outcomes in similar cases. (Put somewhat
differently, norm uniformity is appearance-based, related to the way the doc-
trine "looks" on the outside, whereas outcome uniformity is reality-based, re-
lated to the way the doctrine works on the ground.) Norm uniformity and out-
come uniformity often coexist. When the Court articulates doctrine in the form
of bright-line rules, lower courts will apply those same rules in factually similar
cases (giving rise to norm uniformity), and the highly specific nature of those
rules will tend to promote similar judicial outcomes (giving rise to outcome
uniformity). But norm uniformity can sometimes exist in the absence of out-
come uniformity. When the Court formulates doctrine in terms of open-ended
standards, for instance, all lower courts might apply those same standards in
factually similar cases (norm uniformity), but the open-endedness of the
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standards will result in some lower courts failing to "treat like alike" (outcome
non-uniformity) .143
By their nature, the Supreme Court's standards will fail to achieve outcome
uniformity nationwide: their very open-endedness causes similar borderline
cases to come out differently in the courts below. But Supreme Court standards
are capable of producing outcome uniformity within (but not necessarily
among) the various sub-jurisdictions that the Supreme Court oversees (that is,
state court systems and the federal circuits). Those sub-jurisdictions, as we
have seen, can themselves choose to rulify a standard, and in so doing, pro-
spectively narrow the range of outcomes that their own future decisions will
produce. By promoting such uniformity at the intra-jurisdictional level, how-
ever, these jurisdictions will undermine norm uniformity at the inter-
jurisdictional level. Once some sub-jurisdictions start to rulify a standard, they
will make the law appear to be different depending on where a claim is
brought. If a claim is brought, for instance, in the Second Circuit, it might
trigger a per se rule; if the same claim is brought in the Northern District of
California, it might trigger a weak presumption; if brought in New Hampshire
state court, it might trigger a totality of the circumstances analysis. Where once
an outside observer saw a single, un-rulified standard governing across all sub-
jurisdictions nationwide, she will now perceive a patchwork of varying legal
approaches that differ from state to state and circuit to circuit.
To the extent that the Court wants to avoid this outcome, an effective solu-
tion is to promulgate a rule against rulification. The anti-rulification rule will
ensure "norm uniformity" across sub-jurisdictions by requiring that all sub-
jurisdictional applications of the standard invoke the same doctrinal test, shorn
of any divergent rule-like elaborations that might otherwise crop up around the
country. To be clear, the rule against rulification will have little effect on out-
come uniformity within these sub-jurisdictions. Indeed, by prohibiting indi-
vidual sub-jurisdictions from pursuing outcome uniformity within their own
boundaries, the anti-rulification rule might even undermine outcome uni-
formity, at least at the local level. At the end of the day, though, that may be a
price worth paying in exchange for the virtues of norm uniformity. Appearanc-
es can be important, even when deceiving.' 4 Where uniformity is involved, for
instance, there may be sound reasons - grounded in values of fairness, stability,
or legitimacy -for making the law "look" as constant as possible, even if devia-
143. Cf. Scalia, supra note 19, at 1179 (noting that to adopt a "totality of the circumstances" ap-
proach to the law "is effectively to conclude that uniformity is not a particularly important
objective with respect to the legal question at issue").
144. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HAkv. L. REv. 1563
(2012) (documenting and analyzing the use of "appearance-based" justifications in the law).
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tions in application will inevitably occur. 4 If, in contrast, below-the-surface
reality matters more than surface-level appearance, then rules against rulifica-
tion will not provide much in the way of uniformity-enhancing assistance. In
fact, the "half-loaf" result of promoting outcome uniformity within, but not
across, national subunits may be preferable to the "no-loaf' result of failing to
promote any outcome uniformity at all.
An altogether different take on these issues might maintain that uniformity
values should play a minimal role in influencing the choice between mandatory
and permissive standards. One might conclude, for instance, that neither actual
nor apparent uniformity represents an especially important value within the
law, contending that uniformity serves at most as an indirect proxy for other
values such as fairness, legitimacy, and efficiency that we should simply pursue
directly. 46 A related argument might posit that even though uniformity should
sometimes influence doctrinal design, it should not do so once the Court has
made up its mind as to the first-order choice between standards and rules. If
the Court wishes to promote uniformity, then it should simply articulate the
governing test in terms of a rule, thereby securing for itself both outcome uni-
formity and norm uniformity across and within all sub-jurisdictions. But once
that choice comes out in favor of a standard, the argument would continue, the
Court should no longer consider uniformity-related values when deciding
whether to adopt a rule against rulification. These arguments, which I can only
sketch here, certainly merit further examination. For now, however, it suffices
to note that even with standards on the books, the Court and its subordinates
can continue to manipulate the different types of uniformity (and nonuni-
formity) that these standards yield in the courts below. That is a consequence
worth taking seriously for anyone who regards uniformity as worth pursuing
for its own sake.
145. Evan Caminker has suggested, for instance, that "uniform interpretation of federal law helps
to secure popular respect for judicial authority" and that "[flederal courts depend on the
perceived legitimacy of their enterprise for their authority over other government actors and
the general public." Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-LookingAspects
of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEx. L. Rav. 1, 40 (1994) (emphasis added). On this ra-
tionale alone, norm uniformity of doctrine might itself be intrinsically valuable, even if actu-
al disuniformity lurks below the surface.
146. Cf Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. Ray. 1567, 1571 (20o8) ("Although this
Article does not claim that heterogeneity is never problematic, it does question whether uni-





Finally, anti-rulification rules can reduce the transparency of lower court
decision making. Judges who repeatedly apply an open-ended standard may
come to rely on informal rules of thumb to guide their resolution of factually
similar cases. (For example, a judge might come to regard all dogs certified by
one agency as presumptively qualified to detect drug-related odors, while re-
garding all dogs certified by another agency as presumptively not qualified to
do the same.) But if rulification of a standard is formally prohibited, the judge
has no reason to reveal - and indeed, a strong reason not to reveal - the implicit
bases for her decisions. Put another way, rather than deter lower courts from
relying on rules, mandatory standards might instead induce them to rely on
rules clandestinely. Under many circumstances, this will be a bad thing, leav-
ing litigants and reviewing courts at least partially unaware of the actual ra-
tionales for a judge's decision.
This last point, to be clear, should not count as a universally dispositive
reason against adopting an anti-rulification rule. Many dubious factors can and
probably do influence lower court decision making, even in the face of clear
doctrinal instructions to ignore them. But it does not follow from that fact that
courts should be given free rein to rest their decisions on illegitimate considera-
tions. 7 Thus, where the Court feels strongly that the rule-based implementa-
tion of a standard will take the doctrine in an undesirable direction, it should
instruct the lower courts not to rulify regardless of whether some lower courts
might subversively employ hidden rules of thumb. (After all, not all lower
courts will ignore the Supreme Court's direction, and at least the high court's
adoption of a rule against rulification will help to reduce reliance on either
open or clandestine rules of thumb.) On the other hand, if the case against ruli-
fication is weaker, or if the lower courts are likely to face particularly powerful
temptations to rulify a standard, transparency concerns could tip the scale in
favor of permitting rulification going forward. Under these circumstances, the
marginal benefits to be derived from an anti-rulification rule may fail to justify
the very real costs of creating a disconnect between doctrinal rhetoric and deci-
sional reality.
147. As I have elsewhere put the point, "Even if we could prove the realist maxim that breakfast
food influences judicial decisionmaking, we would still discourage judges from writing
opinions about bacon, toast, and eggs." Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a
Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 991, 1044 (2012) (foot-
note omitted).
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F. Conclusion: Methodological Minimalism?
If the foregoing discussion has shown anything, it is that rules against ruli-
fication exert a variety of different effects (implicating a variety of different val-
ues) on lower-court application of the Supreme Court's standards. I have
looked at each of these effects in isolation, so it remains to be asked whether
any general conclusions can be drawn from viewing these effects in combina-
tion. What, in light of the observations offered above, should we say about the
overall desirability of rules against rulification and the circumstances in which
they should be used?
One way of thinking through these issues relates to the notion of judicial
minimalism. Minimalists tend to favor forms of substantive decision making
that are "catalytic rather than preclusive" -apt to spur more, rather than less,
investigation, information-sharing, and dialogue regarding the appropriate
substance of the law. 48 This being so, legal commentators have often associat-
ed minimalist judging with standard-based judging. As Sunstein himself has
suggested, "A preference for minimalism is very close, analytically, to a prefer-
ence for standards over rules." 49 This makes sense as far as the substance of
the doctrine is concerned, but how should a minimalist feel about rules that
mandate the use of (un-rulified) standards down the line?
On one view, minimalists should favor anti-rulification rules because anti-
rulification rules promote the use of standards, and standards are friendly to
the minimalist cause. But standards are friendly to the minimalist cause largely
because they leave matters open for renewed consideration in subsequent cases,
furnishing future decisionmakers with continued, unrestricted space in which
148. SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 6.
149. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1899, 1909 (2006). Sunstein
offers this observation in connection with the minimalist jurisprudence of Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, but he has elsewhere indicated that the point applies more generally. See id.
at 1902 ("Any defense of minimalist adjudication is essentially the same in principle as a de-
fense of standards over rules .... "); Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1049,
1O87 (2009) ("Minimalists think that their approach has the key advantage of standards:
flexibility in the face of an uncertain future."); see also Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-
Doctrine: An Empirical Assessment offudicial Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1045, 1O83 (2009) ("[A]t least in the context of the Rehnquist Court, there seems
to be a close connection between rules and maximalism on the one hand and standards and
minimalism on the other, and indeed scholars often lump the two categories together.");
Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 29-31
(2009) (noting that "[t]he debate between vertical maximalism and minimalism may re-




to pursue further refinements of the law.15' This space, it turns out, is not so
unrestricted when a rule against rulification mandates strict preservation of a
standard's un-rulified character. For instance, when it comes to the question of
whether to emphasize values of fit in applying law to fact, a mandatory stand-
ard closes off further consideration of the issue, whereas a permissive standard
does not. The same is true when it comes to the question of how (if at all) to
specify the content of an open-ended norm. So, too, with the question of
whether to furnish trial courts with increased decisional autonomy and the
questions of whether and how to pursue uniformity within sub-jurisdictional
boundaries. With respect to all these questions, and perhaps others as well,
mandatory standards end the discussion, whereas permissive standards keep
the discussion going. Mandatory standards, from the minimalist perspective,
thus impose very real costs. Their open-ended substantive language imbues
them with an attractively minimalist veneer, but their absolute prohibitions on
rulification give them an intensely preclusive effect.
To the extent that any general observations can be offered about the rela-
tive merits and demerits of rules against rulification, I conclude with the fol-
lowing thought: given the substantial tension that exists between the priorities
of minimalists and the effects of anti-rulification rules, I suspect that one's
overall attitude toward minimalism will operate as a reasonably reliable indica-
tor of one's overall attitude toward the project of prohibiting down-the-road
rulification of Supreme Court standards. The ardent minimalist should find
much to fear in rules against rulification, whereas the milquetoast minimalist
(and especially the ardent maximalist) will find nothing of great concern. This
is because rules against rulification, being rules themselves, freeze certain sub-
stantive and methodological choices that minimalists will often prefer to leave
fluid. Standards leave the law unsettled, but only when those standards are
themselves subject to unsettlement.
None of this is to say that minimalists will never wish to settle anything.
Indeed, where the minimalist enjoys a high degree of confidence that an area of
doctrine is most effectively applied in standard-like terms, then she should em-
brace anti-rulification rules right along with her maximalist colleagues. First-
order standards, after all, will not always reflect tentativeness, ambivalence, or
passivity regarding the form and substance that the doctrine should assume.
First-order standards can also reflect a range of deep and definitive value
judgments, to which even a minimalist might sometimes unswervingly sub-
scribe. Within some areas of doctrine, for instance, standards may reflect the
i5o. Some minimalists aim to leave things undecided not for the sake of fostering the gradual
development of the law, but for the sake of promoting fairness and equity in individual cas-
es. I do not rule out that possibility, but that is not the understanding of minimalism that I
reference here.
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Justices' firm belief that problems of fit are especially concerning, that trial
courts should enjoy substantial independence from intermediate court interfer-
ence, or that norm uniformity across sub-jurisdictions is significantly more de-
sirable than outcome uniformity within them. Where high levels of certainty
on these and other matters exist, rules against rulification will often make a
good deal of sense. But where such matters are subject to greater uncertainty,
then prohibiting rulification of the standard conflicts with a central animating
purpose of the standard itself- namely, that of postponing resolution of a diffi-
cult legal issue.
IV. WORKING WITH ANTI-RULIFICATION RULES
The previous Part identified several consequences that follow from the
adoption of a rule against rulification. This Part turns to a second set of issues,
which involve not the question of whether to adopt anti-rulification rules, but
rather how to deal with anti-rulification rules once the decision to adopt them
has been made. Part IV.A offers some preliminary thoughts on how the Su-
preme Court should go about articulating rules against rulification within its
own decisions. Part 1V.B then turns to the lower courts' task of detecting such
rules, asking in particular how lower courts should respond to mixed signals
from the Court about the presence of anti-rulification rules, and whether the
courts may permissibly regard even clearly stated anti-rulification rules as non-
binding dicta.
A. Creating Anti-Rulification Rules
1. Separating Substance from Methodology
The Court often announces an anti-rulification rule in the course of review-
ing a lower court's effort to rulify a standard. In Florida v. Harris, for instance,
the Court reviewed a Florida Supreme Court decision that had set forth a
"strict evidentiary checklist" for establishing the requisite level of reliability for
drug-detection dogs."s' But simply invalidating one particular rulification of a
standard will not suffice to create a generalized rule against rulification. Absent
further explanation, such a holding would merely establish that the lower court
erred by rulifying the standard in the way it did. Furthermore, such a holding
by its nature would not stand for the broader proposition that all other at-
tempts at rulifying the standard are similarly invalid. Standards can be rulified
151. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1O5O, io56 (2013).
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in many ways. Deeming one such rulification inappropriate is not the same as
prohibiting rulification across the board.
In setting forth a rule against rulification, the Court must take care to dis-
aggregate its substantive evaluation of a particular rulification from its meth-
odological evaluation of whether a standard may ever be rulified. The Court
does not always engage in this kind of disaggregation, as Harris itself reveals.
Some portions of the Court's opinion criticized the Florida Supreme Court for
failing to evaluate the probable cause question on a flexible, case-by-case ba-
sis." 2 Other portions of the opinion, however, criticized the substance of the
particular evidentiary checklist that the Florida court had devised." 3 Logically,
these lines of argument point to different conclusions. If the problem with the
Florida court's reasoning lay in its rulifying methodology, then the adequacy of
the particular checklist at issue should have been irrelevant to the Court's opin-
ion. If, by contrast, the problem with the Florida court's opinion stemmed
from the substance of the checklist itself, then the Court should have reversed,
while making clear that other lower courts remained free to experiment with
other sorts of evidentiary checklists (or alternative rulifications of the Gates
standard) in future cases. Under no circumstances, however, should the Court
have inferred from the substantive inadequacy of the Florida court's checklist
that all future assessments of a dog sniffs reliability should eschew reliance on
determinate rules. 4
There is another point, too. It may well be that the most effective vehicles
for establishing anti-rulification rules are cases-unlike Harris-in which the
particular rulifications at issue do not strike the Court as egregiously off-base.
If the Court really wishes to convince us that a given standard should never be
rulified, it should focus on the best possible attempts at rulification, rather than
highlighting defects in the attempts that it regards as obviously misguided.
Consider, for instance, the Court's discussion of the Patent Act's "nonobvious-
152. Id. at 1056 ("No more for dogs than for human informants is such an inflexible checklist the
way to prove reliability, and thus establish probable cause.").
153. Id. at lo56-57 (criticizing the Florida Supreme Court's reliance on field data, which "may
markedly overstate a dog's real false positives," and contending that "It] he better measure of
a dog's reliability thus comes away from the field, in controlled testing environments").
154. This is not to say that a Court wishing to establish an anti-rulification rule must avoid cri-
tiquing the particular rulification before it. Pointing out the inadequacies in an individual
rulification might enable the Court to illustrate the bad results that bright-line rules are ca-
pable of generating. Even if, in other words, the substantive inadequacies of one rulification
cannot logically establish the futility of trying to rulify in the first place, they may help to
highlight the sort of problems that many (if not all) rulifications of a standard are likely to
share. That might have been a way for the Court in Harris to reconcile its criticisms of the
Florida court's checklist with a categorical prohibition on rulification in future cases. But at
the least, the Court was not careful to frame its opinion in this way.
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ness" requirement in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.' There, the Federal
Circuit had developed a "teaching, suggestions, and motivations" ("TSM") test
for evaluating the obviousness of combination-based inventions.' 6 In stark
contrast to Harris, in which the Court went out of its way to criticize several
substantive assumptions underlying the lower court's attempted rulification of
the Gates standard, the KSR opinion actually endorsed the intuitions underly-
ing the lower court's TSM test. The test, the Court emphasized, had "captured
a helpful insight," 15 as it reflected the common-sense principle that "it can be
important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary
skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new
invention does." 8 But even helpful insights, the Court went on to explain,
could not justify the adoption of "rigid and mandatory formulas," which
threatened to reduce the obviousness analysis to "a formalistic conception of
the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation.' ' s9 Having endorsed the sub-
stantive thrust of the test, the Court could more persuasively demonstrate why
the "[r]igid preventative rules" that emerged from the test were not good-
why, that is, such rules threatened to "deny factfinders recourse to common
sense" in evaluating obviousness claims. 6 ° By steering its focus away from the
substantive underpinnings of the TSM test and focusing more on the rigidity
of the test itself, the Court in KSR International could offer a somewhat more
direct and persuasive justification for its methodological prohibition on rulify-
ing the obviousness standard. 6 '
155. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
156. Id. at 407.
1s7. Id. at 418.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 419.
16o. Id. at 421.
161. This is, to be clear, not a distinction I wish to overdraw. The boundary between substance
and methodology, much like the boundary between substance and procedure, tends to break
down at the margins. Arguably, some of the KSR Court's criticisms of the Federal Circuit's
analysis went as much to the "substance" of the TSM test as they did to the rule-like nature
of the test. See, e.g., id. (criticizing the TSM test as reflecting an unduly pessimistic view of
judges' susceptibility to hindsight bias in evaluating obviousness claims). Even so, KSR did
take pains to suggest that the basic underlying insights of the TSM test were valid and
worth attending to, whereas Harris took pains to suggest that the Florida Supreme Court's
evidentiary checklist suffered from a bevy of erroneous premises. If the purpose of the deci-
sion is to establish a general rule against rulification, applicable across the whole range of
potential rulifications that a lower court might derive, then a KSR-type analysis, which
identifies problems with rulification even in the presence of a pretty decent substantive rule,
is more likely to rest on a solid justificatory foundation. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has
managed to read KSR to just this effect. See, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. AlphaPharm
Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("As long as the [TSM] test is not applied as
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2. Practicing What One Preaches
A second guiding principle for the creation of anti-rulification rules may
seem self-evident. Once the Court has prohibited rulification of a standard, it
should abide by its own proscription. In this respect, too, the Court's opinion
in Harris fell flat. Having upbraided the Florida Supreme Court for formulat-
ing an "evidentiary checklist" of its own, the Court went on to describe the ap-
plicable Fourth Amendment principles in suspiciously checklist-like terms.
Consider some of the guidance the Court offered regarding the proper way to
conduct a dog-sniffing probable cause inquiry (which, for dramatic effect, I
present in quasi-checklist format):
" "[T]he decision below treats records of a dog's field performance
as the gold standard in evidence, when in most cases they have rel-
atively limited import.1
62
" "The better measure of a dog's reliability thus comes away from the
field, in controlled testing environments.
"
,63
" '[E]vidence of a dog's satisfactory performance in a certification or
training program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his
alert.
' 16 4
"The same is true, even in the absence of formal certification, if the
dog has recently and successfully completed a training program
that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs.'
6
,
"A defendant, however, must have an opportunity to challenge
such evidence of a dog's reliability, whether by cross-examining the
testifying officer or by introducing his own fact or expert wit-
heS.i ' 66
ness."6
a 'rigid and mandatory' formula, that test can provide 'helpful insight' to an obviousness in-
quiry.").
16z. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1o56 (2013).
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"If the State has produced proof from controlled settings that a dog
performs reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant has not
contested that showing, then the court should find probable
cause."6
In fairness to the Court, none of these prescriptions absolutely requires that
future assessors of dog reliability accord dispositive weight to one or another
type of evidence. But these and other statements from Harris set forth a sur-
prisingly specific framework for evaluating reliability in future cases, thereby
complicating lower courts' ability to apply the probable cause standard in the
"fluid" and "flexible" manner that Harris purported to demand. 68 Having
called for the pure application of an unrulified standard to the facts of each
case, the Court muddied the waters of its own methodological directive by
identifying several general, seemingly non-holistic principles that all such ap-
plications must honor."6 9
Imagine, for instance, that a post-Harris lower court must render a reliabil-
ity determination vis-a-vis a dog that has been certified by a newly established
and highly reputed training agency. The court might wish to establish, as a
general rule, that certification by the agency is per se sufficient to establish a
dog's reliability. Can it so hold? On the one hand, doing so seems consistent
with (if not expressly required by) the Harris Court's suggestion that "evidence
of a dog's satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can
itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert." 17 On the other hand, such a
holding would seem to establish the very sort of "bright-line rule" that Harris
explicitly eschewed. In short, the lower court faces a catch-22: It may accord
the agency's certification non-dispositive weight and thereby invite criticism on
the ground that it undervalued a type of evidence that Harris deemed to be crit-
ically important. Or it may treat the agency's certification as dispositive and
thereby invite criticism on the ground that it was "prescrib[ing] ... an inflexi-
ble set of evidentiary requirements.' 7 ' Acting one way would ignore Harris's
167. Id. at 1058.
16g. Id. at 1055-56.
169. See Kit Kinports, The Dog Days of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 1o8 Nw. U. L. REv. COL-
LOQUY 64, 65 (2013) (characterizing the Court's holding in Harris as a "sweeping rule that a
drug dog's positive alert is enough to create a presumption of probable cause so long as the
dog either 'recently and successfully completed a training program' or was certified by a
'bona fide organization"' (quoting Harris, 133 S.Ct. at 1057)); see also id. at 79 ("[The opin-
ion] generate[s] rigid rules in place of the more commonsense totality-of-the-circumstances
standards favored in the Court's precedents.").
170. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1057.
171. Id. at 1058.
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substantive guidance regarding credible evidence of sniff-search reliability; act-
ing the other way would violate Harris's rule against rulification.
There are, to be sure, valid ways of reconciling this tension. One might
suggest, for instance, that the point of Harris was not to condemn the use of
presumptions and generalizations as a categorical matter, but rather to set an
upper bound on the extent to which lower courts may embrace presumptions
and generalizations when deciding sniff-search cases. In this sense, we might
understand Harris as itself accomplishing a partial rulification of the probable
cause inquiry, while simultaneously instructing lower courts not to move that
inquiry any further toward the rule end of the spectrum. There is nothing il-
logical in such a holding; the Court can cogently instruct its subordinates to
establish this much ex ante guidance but no more. To the extent that this is the
true holding of Harris, however, it is a holding at odds with the anti-
rulification language that permeates the opinion. The true import of the deci-
sion would have been easier to discern if the Court had either toned down its
rhetoric regarding the "fluid" and "common sense" nature of probable cause
review or refrained from giving such detailed guidance regarding future appli-
cations of the probable cause standard.
B. Detecting Anti-Rulification Rules
1. Thresholds of Clarity
What about the role of lower courts in determining whether they are
bound by anti-rulification rules? As we saw in Part II, the Supreme Court does
not always speak with clarity regarding the methodological obligations it wish-
es to impose on the courts below. One difficulty, as we have seen, is the occa-
sional opinion that blends together substantive and methodological critiques;
when the Supreme Court attacks a lower court's rulification of a standard, does
it intend to wipe out all such rulifications of that standard or merely the partic-
ular rulification that the lower court used? Further difficulties arise when, as in
Harris, the Court condemns rulification with one hand while arguably engag-
ing in rulification with the other. And the Court can also be unclear as to
whether it is merely defending its own choice to adopt a standard or taking the
further step of prohibiting rulification of the standard in future cases. In these
and other ways, the Supreme Court can generate uncertainty regarding the ex-
istence of an anti-rulification rule. In the face of such uncertainty, the question
arises: what should lower courts do?
Consider, for instance, the law of personal jurisdiction. When the Court
first set forth its "minimum contacts" standard for personal jurisdiction analy-
sis, it characterized the inquiry as one that could not "be simply mechanical or
quantitative" but rather must "depend ... upon the quality and nature of the
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activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure."'72 This language-along
with other statements from the Court's personal jurisdiction case law'73 - has
led some lower courts to resist adopting rules to facilitate their own application
of International Shoe and its progeny. These courts, in other words, have felt
bound not only by the substance of the Court's minimum contacts precedents,
but also by what they see as a clearly stated methodological preference for
standards over rules. 74 But if you go back and peruse the relevant case law, you
will not find the Court ever issuing a direct edict of the sort we encountered in
Part II -an edict, in other words, that requires lower courts to apply the mini-
mum contacts standard in a way that proceeds case-by-case and takes into ac-
count the totality of the circumstances. Rather, International Shoe's warnings
about mechanistic and quantitative decision making addressed the issue of
what sort of substantive inquiry the Court itself should adopt for purposes of
172. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
173. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,478 (1985) ("The Court long ago rejected
the notion that personal jurisdiction might turn on 'mechanical' tests or on 'conceptualis-
tic... theories of the place of contracting or of performance.'" (citations omitted) (quoting
Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943)));
Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) ("We recognize that this de-
termination is one in which few answers will be written 'in black and white. The greys are
dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable."' (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334
U. S. 541, 545 (1948))). But see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (198o) (noting that due process is intended to "give[] a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit").
174. See, e.g., Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1222 (ilth Cir. 2009) ("[W]e
have not developed or adopted a specific approach to determining relatedness; instead, we
have heeded the Supreme Court's warning against using 'mechanical or quantitative' tests."
(quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319)); O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 320
(3d Cir. 2007) (declining-for purposes of specific jurisdiction analysis-to treat but-for
causation as a dispositive indicium of an alleged tort's "relatedness" to the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state, in part because "the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction cases
have repeatedly warned against the use of 'mechanical or quantitative' tests" (quoting Int'l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319)); Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9 th Cir.
1993) (declining to adopt the per se rule that "acts intended to harm a corporation cannot be
said to be directed at any particular geographic location" on the ground that "[s]uch a cate-
gorical approach is antithetical to [the Court's] admonishment that the personal jurisdiction
inquiry cannot be answered through the application of a mechanical test"); see also Clemens
v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 386 (sth Cir. 2010) (Haynes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority opinion -whose personal jurisdiction analysis focused heavily on the "setting of
[the defendant's] allegedly defamatory statements"- had the effect of "unduly narrow[ing]
the minimum contacts and specific jurisdiction inquiry to a mechanical or technical formula-
tion, rather than the 'highly realistic' approach urged by the Supreme Court" (quoting Burg-
er King, 471 U.S. at 478-79)).
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establishing guiding principles of minimum contacts analysis. But what works
best for the Court in denoting first-order doctrinal principles of personal juris-
diction doctrine may not work best for subordinate courts tasked with translat-
ing those principles into on-the-ground results. Put another way, one reason
why the Court might wish to decline adopting a "mechanical or quantitative"
test is precisely because such a test reduces lower courts' freedom to shape the
personal jurisdiction inquiry in whatever manner they see fit. So International
Shoe and its progeny could be read as simply offering a justification for the
Court's choice of a standard over a rule, rather than an explicit instruction that
the standard, once adopted, may not be rulified in future cases.
How should lower courts resolve uncertainties of this sort? In my view,
they should apply a strong presumption against anti-rulification rules, adher-
ing to such rules only when the Court has established them with crystal clarity.
That preference derives in part, I admit, from my own pro-minimalist sympa-
thies, which render me somewhat leery of the rigid methodological constraints
that rules against rulification tend to impose on lower court judges. But apart
from that point, there exists a further reason for presuming the nonexistence of
anti-rulification rules in the face of doctrinal uncertainty, which relates to the
information-forcing benefits that such a presumption will likely produce. 7'
Simply put, the Supreme Court is more likely to offer clearer and more con-
sistent methodological guidance when lower courts treat rules against rulifica-
tion as absent-until-proven-present (rather than present-until-proven-absent).
To see why, suppose that all the lower courts treated an area of case law -
for instance, the Court's personal jurisdiction case law-as establishing a rule
against rulification. Going forward, the lower courts would apply the mini-
mum contacts standard in a narrow, fact-specific manner, issuing opinions that
did not venture far beyond the unique circumstances of each case. That, in
turn, would render the lower courts less likely to produce opinions that attract-
ed the Supreme Court's attention. , 6 They would sometimes err in applying
175. Cf. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,97 (1989) (outlining a theory of "penalty default rules," which
"can be justified as a way to encourage the production of information").
176. Hard evidence of this phenomenon is difficult to obtain, in large part because the Court
does not often make explicit its reasons for granting (or denying) certiorari with respect to
the petitions it receives. But something along these lines may have been at work in the re-
cent decision of DaimlerAG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). The Ninth Circuit had found
that a German public stock company was subject to general personal jurisdiction in the state
of California, owing largely to the activities of a corporate-owned subsidiary that conducted
operations there. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit appeared to adopt for itself a sort of per se
rule, according to which a corporation assumes all the jurisdictional "contacts" created by
subsidiaries with which it has established an "agency" relationship. Though ultimately rest-
ing its holding on other grounds, the Court did express concern over the potential breadth
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the standard too leniently or too strictly, but the consequences of their errors
would be relatively minor, owing to the highly fact-specific nature of the opin-
ions accompanying the courts' erroneous holdings. If, by contrast, the lower
courts painted broadly- that is, they issued general and widely applicable di-
rectives regarding the application of the minimum contacts test -their deci-
sions would be more likely to arouse the interest of the Court itself and gener-
ate clarifying guidance as to whether a rule against rulification does in fact
exist.
Put another way, no matter how one feels about rules against rulification as
a normative matter, one should favor a default rule that permits rulification of
a standard unless and until the practice has been expressly prohibited by the
Court. Rulifying a standard in the face of Supreme Court uncertainty is more
likely to flag the unresolved issue for the Court, at least as compared to the al-
ternative approach of assuming that rulification is banned. That is not to say
that lower courts should go about rulifying every standard they see just for the
sake of getting the Supreme Court's attention. The direct merits and demerits
of a potential rulification should obviously weigh most heavily in the lower
court's decision. But where a lower court would otherwise be inclined to rulify a
standard, it should not hold back simply because the Supreme Court has issued
mixed signals regarding the permissibility of such a move. Refraining from
rulifying increases the likelihood that the Supreme Court's guidance on the
question will remain in a muddle, whereas rulifying the standard increases the
likelihood that the muddle will be tidied up.
of the Ninth Circuit's proposed agency rule, which, among other things, "did not advert to
th[e] prospect" that "[a]gencies ... come in many sizes and shapes," appeared "to subject
foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or af-
filiate," and had been formulated in a way that "will always yield a pro-jurisdiction answer."
Id. at 759-60. That language, while by no means establishing a rule against rulification, did
at least convey skepticism regarding the general project of embedding bright-line rules
within the framework of general jurisdiction analysis. That is useful information for the
Ninth Circuit to have going forward. And it is information that the Ninth Circuit would
have been less likely to receive if it had resolved the original case in a more standard-
dependent (and hence less cert-worthy) manner. See id. at 766 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (noting that the Court had granted certiorari on the question "whether it vio-
lates due process for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion based solely on the fact that an indirect corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf of
the defendant in the forum State") (emphasis added) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiora-
ri at 1, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965))); see also Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2, Daim-
ler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965) ("[T]he Ninth Circuit's decision has implications that extend
well beyond this case.").
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2. Dicta Versus Holding?
Even if Supreme Court precedent establishes an anti-rulification rule with
absolute clarity, lower courts might remain tempted to dismiss such a rule as
"dicta" rather than "holding." The dicta/holding distinction defies easy defini-
tion,"7 but in simplified form, it rests on the idea that pronouncements of law
underpinning the actual result of a case are different from pronouncements of
law that merely accompany the result. Only the former sorts of propositions,
longstanding convention holds, constitute binding authority with the force of
horizontal and vertical stare decisis. Extracurricular ponderings about the
law - not necessary to the outcome of a case - may be treated as persuasive au-
thority, but nothing more.
Might anti-rulification rules qualify as non-binding dicta? Certainly, we
can imagine cases in which the answer is "yes." If, say, the Court were to opine
on the standard-based nature of the eBay four-factor test in a case having noth-
ing to do with a request for injunctive relief, then its discussion of eBay would
count as non-binding dicta under even the narrowest definition of the term.
But more difficult questions emerge in cases of the sort we examined in Part II;
in these cases, the Court reverses the lower court on the ground that it errone-
ously relied on a rule to facilitate its application of a standard. Arguably, anti-
rulification rules might still qualify as dicta in these circumstances, on the theo-
ry that only the Court's objection to the particular rulification at issue in the
case is necessary to the outcome of that case. On this understanding, for in-
stance, the Court's analysis in Harris yielded a holding only insofar as it reject-
ed the particular "evidentiary checklist" that the Florida Supreme Court em-
ployed. The Court's broader insistence that no rulifications should ever attend
sniff-search reliability evaluations was not needed to reach that result: whatev-
er the Court's feelings about alternative lower court rulifications in other cases,
the invalidity of the Florida court's checklist was itself sufficient to doom the
decision below. More generally, the argument goes, globally applicable anti-
rulification rules will always count as dicta as long as they prove broader than
17. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REv. 953, 1071
(2005) ("[A] judge's selection of a particular interpretive methodology will not necessarily
credit that methodological choice as a holding."); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Consti-
tution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1249, 1256 (2006) ("If the court's judgment and
the reasoning which supports it would remain unchanged, regardless of the proposition in
question, that proposition plays no role in explaining why the judgment goes for the win-
ner. It is superfluous to the decision and is dictum."); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 67 (1996) ("When an opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also
those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound.").
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necessary to justify the Court's invalidation of one and only one attempt to
rulify a standard.
This line of reasoning proves too much. It suggests that all Supreme Court
rules (whether or not about rulification) count as dicta rather than holding,
since all rules purport to decide more than the particular case that accompanies
their announcement. Analogous reasoning, for instance, would hold that the
prophylactic rule adopted in Miranda was non-binding dicta, on the theory
that a detailed description of how police officers should warn suspects in future
cases was not necessary to the Court's holding that the particular warning be-
fore it violated the law. But lower courts routinely treat the Miranda require-
ments as binding Supreme Court precedent,' 78 and the Supreme Court has it-
self suggested that the requirements are intended to apply as such. 179 This is
true of many rules that the Court has adopted; lower courts adhere to the rule,
even though the rule decides more than the particular case from which it
emerged.
An alternative attempt to classify anti-rulification rules as dicta might em-
phasize their methodological character. Stare decisis norms, this argument
goes, typically apply to first-order dictates of law and not to second-order rules
about crafting the dictates themselves. Along these lines, as several legislation
scholars have noted, lower courts typically do not treat the Supreme Court's
preferred methods of statutory interpretation as carrying stare decisis effect.
For instance, even if the Supreme Court has eschewed reliance on legislative
history when interpreting a section of the U.S. Code, lower courts may still
consult legislative history in interpreting that same section in a future case.so If
that is true regarding methods of statutory interpretation, should it not also be
true regarding methods of law application?
This argument, however, conflates two different questions: (1) whether the
Court does accord stare decisis effect to its methodological rules and (2) wheth-
er the Court may in fact do so. The curiosity regarding methodologies of statu-
tory interpretation arises from the Court's general refusal to enter the prece-
dential fray, not from any sort of widespread understanding that the Court
178. See, e.g., United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85, 92 (1st Cir. 2002) (characterizing Mi-
randa as a "constitutional rule binding on the federal and state governments").
179. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 439 (2000) (characterizing the Miranda warn-
ing as a "constitutional rule" that Congress could not abrogate by statute).
18o. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodolo-
gy?, 96 GEo. L.J. 1863, 1875 (2008) ("[T]he Court has strongly suggested that doctrines of
statutory interpretation do not get stare decisis effect but has not explicitly and conclusively
so established."); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law"
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 19o9 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court "does
not treat its interpretive pronouncements as law").
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would be powerless to create binding rules of interpretive methodology if it so
desired. In fact, as Abbe Gluck has pointed out, the Court has assigned binding
precedential status to a wide range of methodological instructions on matters
other than statutory interpretation, including "Tide VII's burden-shifting re-
gime, the rules of federal contract interpretation, federal choice-of-law rules,
interpretive regimes for admiralty, and so on." '  Moreover, lower courts do
not bat an eye at the idea that they must treat such rules as binding precedent.
Rules against rulification, which the Court characterizes as binding on the
courts below, are no different. If common practice is a guide, then -setting
aside the unusual case of statutory interpretation -the methodological charac-
ter of anti-rulification rules is not likely to deprive them of binding effect.s2
181. Gluck, supra note 18o, at 1918; see also Foster, supra note 179, at 1882 ("Indeed, in some cases
the Justices agree that particular interpretive principles-such as the rule of lenity-or par-
ticular interpretive frameworks -such as the Chevron framework- apply, although it is also
true that they frequently disagree about the contours of those principles and frameworks.");
Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare Decisis as
Applied to Judicial Methodology, 1O8 COLUM. L. REv. 681, 684 (2008) ("[T]he Supreme Court
already treats many, but not all, subdecisions based on statutory interpretation as binding
precedent without explicitly saying so."). That is to say nothing of the practices in state
courts and courts in other countries, which very often accord stare decisis effect to methodo-
logical rules, including those that concern statutory interpretation. See Abbe R. Gluck, The
States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified
Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1847 (2010) ("[T]he ability of the state courts studied to artic-
ulate a single methodological approach-and so to treat methodology as 'law'-is not
unique. Highest courts in other countries, too, have implemented controlling interpretive
regimes."); see also Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
GEO. L.J. 341 (2010) (examining divergent legislative preferences toward methods of inter-
pretation). A related line of investigation -bracketed for purposes of my inquiry here-
concerns the question whether Congress may require courts to favor one set of interpretive
methodologies over another. Compare Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, 115 HApv. L. REV. 2085 (2002) (yes), with Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Pra-
kash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20
CONST. COMMENT. 97 (2003) (no).
182. Common practice, however, could be wrong. Perhaps there really is something different
about the Court's methodological directives that render them something other than "law"
and hence not subject to stare decisis. That is an interesting question, to be sure, and one on
which the burgeoning literature on the precedential status of interpretive methodologies has
hazarded some preliminary answers. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 181, at 345 ("The common
law should be understood to encompass judicial methodology in addition to the traditional
substantive common law subjects, such as the law of torts."); Connors, supra note 181, at
684 ("[T]he purposes behind traditional stare decisis suggest that the appropriate reform is
to extend the scope of stare decisis to statutory interpretation subdecisions."). For our pur-
poses, however, the law-like nature (or lack thereof) of anti-rulification rules probably mat-
ters less than the simple fact that the Supreme Court purports to make them binding on the
courts below. This fact, coupled with the equally unremarkable fact that the Court can al-
ways reverse lower court judgments that run afoul of its commands, provides reason enough
for lower courts to resist rulification when the Supreme Court has expressly instructed them
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V. VARIATIONS ON THE THEME
Rules against rulification represent an important means by which the Su-
preme Court constrains the method of applying and implementing its stand-
ards in subsequent cases. Might there be other means of imposing such meth-
odological constraints? I now consider three such alternative devices -devices
that, to the best of my knowledge, the Court has never explicitly employed, but
that, like rules against rulification, might restrict (or direct) methodological
choices in a variety of related ways. First, I consider the possibility of pro-
rulification rules, which would expressly instruct the lower courts to rulify
standards that the Supreme Court itself has settled on. Second, I consider the
possibility of "anti-rulification standards," which would discourage but not
prohibit lower court rulification of standards. Finally, I consider the possibility
of "anti-publication rules," which would prohibit lower courts from issuing
published opinions (and hence creating binding precedents) in connection
with a particular standard the Court has created.
A. Pro-Rulification Rules
In Part III, we saw that there exist several reasons why the Court might
wish not to create a rule against rulification. One such reason relates to the val-
ue of lower court experimentation. In particular, when the Court envisions that
it might one day offer specific guidance regarding the application of a legal
norm, but is not yet sure as to what that guidance will be, the best course of ac-
tion might be to issue a permissive standard for now and to see what the lower
courts come up with. Under these circumstances, an anti-rulification rule
would prove counterproductive, on the theory that prohibiting lower court
rulification would defeat the purpose of adopting the standard itself.
If the Court really wished to spur lower court experimentation, perhaps it
should do more than simply not prohibit lower courts from rulifying. Maybe,
that is, the court should affirmatively require lower courts to rulify.
to do so. See David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower
Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2049-50 (2013) (concluding, on the ba-
sis of an empirical study, that "lower courts very rarely invoke the holding-dictum distinc-
tion to reach decisions at odds with higher court dicta"). As a descriptive matter, and per-
haps also as a normative matter, the Court's virtually unchecked power to reverse lower
court judgments whenever it so desires seems sufficient to support the proposition that anti-
rulification rules, once clearly reflective of the Court's desires, carry binding precedential
force. See id. at 2049 ("[T]here is a strong argument to be made that theory entirely di-
vorced from practice can have only limited utility, especially insofar as it is aimed at lawyers
in training or practice and is meant not only to identify normative ideals but also to help
clarify thinking about how law operates.").
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For a rough analogue to this idea, consider the Court's discussion of Article
III standing doctrine in Allen v. Wright.s3 There, in discussing various compo-
nents of the standing inquiry, the Court conceded that Article III standing
"cannot be defined so as to make application of the constitutional standing re-
quirement a mechanical exercise."'8' At the same time, the Court went on to
note that "[t]he absence of precise definitions ... hardly leaves courts at sea in
applying the law of standing."'8' Why? Because Article III standing "is built on
a single basic idea - the idea of separation of powers," and "both federal and
state courts have long experience in applying and elaborating in numerous con-
texts the pervasive and fundamental notion of separation of powers.' 8 6 Put
somewhat differently, subsequent clarification of the doctrine might occur in
the lower courts themselves, since "[d]etermining standing in a particular case
may be facilitated by clarifying principles or even clear rules developed in prior
cases. '' 18 This was, to be sure, not always going to be possible; many issues of
Article III standing would always require "careful judicial examination of a
complaint's allegations. '' ""8 But given the overarching separation-of-powers
principles at play, and given the lower courts' ability to flesh out the contours
of these principles through the common law method, the Court saw an oppor-
tunity for "the gradual clarification of the law through judicial application. "89
To be sure, this language hardly obligated lower courts to start developing
clarifying rules regarding the scope of Article III's limits on standing. Perhaps
the Court intended merely to assuage fears that a vaguely formulated set of Ar-
ticle III standing requirements presaged eternal doctrinal confusion. But one at
least sees within the passage the seeds of what might be a new, and sometimes
useful, technique for developing the contours of the law in an especially inclu-
sive and dialogic way: create a standard at the Supreme Court level and then
expressly invite (if not obligate) the lower courts to develop rules about the
183. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). For similar examples, see Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012)
("Principles elaborated over time in decisions of state and federal courts, and in statutes and
rules, will serve to give more complete guidance as to the factors that should bear upon the
exercise of the judge's discretion."); and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (not-
ing that, to safeguard the fairness of trials against undue publicity, "[t]he courts must take
such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside
interferences"). I am grateful to John Rappaport for bringing these passages to my atten-
tion.
184. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
185. Id.
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standard in subsequent cases. Insofar as greater clarity and specificity of the
doctrine are the overarching desiderata, and insofar as the Court seeks lower
court input on how the doctrine should be clarified and specified, then a "pro-
rulification rule" might best serve the interests of the Court itself.
B. Anti-Rulification Standards
Anti-rulification rules, I have argued, can suffer on account of their rule-
like nature. They categorically render rulification off-limits, leaving minimal
room for future discretion in determining whether the process should take
place. When the absolutism of an anti-rulification rule threatens to do harm,
one possible corrective is to reduce its absoluteness. Rather than prohibit rulifi-
cation outright, the Court might simply issue a non-categorical caution against
rulifying, while still permitting the practice to proceed when exceptional cir-
cumstances so warrant.
I would term such a directive a "standard against rulification." One can im-
agine various forms that such a standard could assume. The Court might hold,
for instance, that lower courts may not rulify unless doing so is "absolutely
necessary to constrain trial court decisionmaking." Or it might provide that
lower courts may rulify, but only in a way that "maintains an adequate degree
of fit between the purpose of the norm and the outcomes that it generates."
The idea, in short, would be to place a thumb on the scale against rulification
without banning the practice altogether.190
Again, I am unaware of any holdings that follow directly along these
lines.191 In practice, though, a standard against rulification might not operate
much differently from Supreme Court doctrines that leave the existence of an
anti-rulification rule unclear.' 92 These sorts of doctrines, as we saw in the pre-
19o. This is consistent with Neal Katyal's general observation that the Justices can sometimes
provide beneficial "guidance and flexibility to lower courts" by offering them non-binding
advice as an occasional alternative to firm doctrinal instructions. See Neal Kumar Katyal,
Judges asAdvicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1709, 18oi (1998).
191. Perhaps one could identify such an anti-rulification standard as implicit in the recent Fourth
Amendment case of City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). There, in declining to
adopt a "broad holding concerning employees' privacy expectations vis-a-vis employer-
provided technological equipment," the Court pointed to "[r]apid changes in the dynamics
of communication and information transmission" and uncertain predictions as to "how
workplace norms ... will evolve." Id. at 759; see also id. at 76o ("It is preferable to dispose of
this case on narrower grounds."). Although never explicitly prohibiting courts from rulify-
ing the standard it embraced, the Court's emphasis on evolving technologies and social
norms might be read as strongly cautioning them against such an approach. I thank Bill
Corbett for pointing this out to me.
192. See supra Part W.A.
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vious Part, do indeed exist. In these areas of doctrine, recall, uncertainty arises
not from a deliberate choice on the part of the Court to vest some measure of
rulifying discretion in the courts below. Rather, the issue is whether, in justify-
ing its own decision to adopt a standard over a rule, the Court has (intentional-
ly or not) directed its subordinates to follow suit when applying that standard
to future cases. This difference aside, however, the upshot of both sorts of deci-
sions is the same. When the Court sends mixed signals about the existence of
an anti-rulification rule, lower courts may feel some, but not total, pressure to
avoid rulifying the standard, much as they would in the face of an express di-
rective from the Court instructing them, say, to avoid rulifying unless absolute-
ly necessary.
As compared to a debatably existent rule against rulification, however, a
standard against rulification is more likely to yield manageable and satisfactory
forms of lower court discretion. For one thing, if a lower court determines that
uncertain precedents do in fact create an anti-rulification rule, then within that
court's jurisdiction, rulifying discretion totally and completely disappears.
With an anti-rulification standard, by contrast, all intermediate courts may
proceed with the knowledge that rulification might be appropriate under some
circumstances. In addition, standards against rulification better enable the
Court to identify the conditions under which rulification of a standard may
continue to take place. If the only source of lower court discretion is doctrinal
confusion regarding the presence of an anti-rulification rule, then the lower
courts may leverage that confusion in a manner that steers their case law in un-
anticipated and undesirable directions. If, by contrast, the source of lower court
discretion is a direct vesting of such discretion by the Court itself, then the
Court can more effectively channel that discretion in the direction it desires.
C. Anti-Publication Rules
We have explored alternatives to anti-rulification rules that are friendlier to
the development of rule-based doctrines in the lower courts. Here, by contrast,
I consider a final possibility that would likely deter rulification even more dras-
tically than would anti-rulification rules themselves. My aim, to be clear, is not
to advocate for or against this particular variation on the theme, which I here
refer to as "rules against publication." Rather, it is merely to identify such rules
as a theoretical possibility and to use them as a means of further highlighting
the tradeoffs implicated by the anti-rulification endeavor.
As we have previously seen,' 93 even with anti-rulification rules in place, the
accretion of precedents over time tends to increase the specificity of legal doc-
193. See supra Part I.C.
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trine. Anti-rulification rules slow down this process, but at the end of the day,
even the most categorical rules against rulification cannot stop rulification from
occurring at all. Today's decisions become tomorrow's precedents. With
enough precedents on the books, application of even mandatory standards may
eventually become more constrained and less holistic than the Court might
wish it to be.
Would the Court be able to stave off even these very gradual processes of
rulification that anti-rulification rules seem powerless to stop? In theory, yes. If
gradual rulification inevitably results from precedential decision making, the
Court could nip it in the bud by prohibiting the issuance of precedential opin-
ions altogether. Many federal courts of appeals regularly issue unpublished
opinions, which carry minimal, if any, precedential weight. This practice is
controversial: scholars have criticized nonprecedential opinions (also called
"summary orders") as, among other things, unconstitutional, 194 unwise, '95 and
unfair to the parties they bind. 9 6 But whatever their flaws, unpublished opin-
ions do provide a means of resolving cases in the present without constraining
the resolution of cases in the future.'97 Therefore, if the Court were really seri-
ous about guaranteeing that each case arising under a standard enjoyed holistic
and commonsensical review, then prohibiting the publication of opinions
about the standard might prove to be an especially potent means of achieving
that result.
194. See, e.g., Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a cir-
cuit rule according nonprecedential effect to unpublished opinions violates Article III "be-
cause it purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the 'judicial"'),
vacated as moot on rehg en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Jessie Allen, Just
Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of Appeals, 29 VT. L. REv. 555, 574-91
(2005) (arguing that nonprecedential opinions potentially violate procedural due process).
195. See, e.g., Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76
S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 788 (2003) ("There is cause to doubt that those 400,000 non-
precedential cases decided in the past two decades received [full consideration].").
196. See, e.g., Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential
Opinions by Statute or Procedural Rule, 79 IND. L.J. 711, 732 (2004) ("A system that permits the
courts to exempt some opinions from this self-governing mechanism [of stare decisis] al-
lows applying courts to make arbitrary decisions because they can ignore prior opinions on
an unreasoned basis, or no basis at all.").
197. That is not to say that lower courts have relied on unpublished opinions for this purpose.
Rather, the primary attraction of the unpublished opinion to the lower court judge is that it
requires less work and therefore allows for a more expeditious clearing of the docket. See
Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Al-
locate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401,414 (2013)




Many readers, I suspect, will blanch at this proposal. Wholly apart from its
arguable unlawfulness,19 8 the issuance of anti-publication rules might seem an
especially meddlesome and heavy-handed move for the Court to make. Why
should the lower courts be told how to handle their own business? Can't they
figure out for themselves whether or not to issue a precedential opinion in a
given case? Or, put somewhat differently, wouldn't anti-publication rules un-
necessarily restrict the ability of lower courts to develop and elaborate on Su-
preme Court precedents in useful and beneficial ways?
In this Article, I have tried to suggest that rules against rulification raise an
analogous set of concerns. Anti-publication rules, after all, amount to nothing
more than anti-rulification rules in super-strong form, pursuing more aggres-
sively and achieving more effectively the same overarching goal. The only real
difference is one of degree-where an anti-rulification rule limits the ability of
lower courts to rulify standards, an anti-publication rule would limit that abil-
ity to an even greater extent. In that sense, then, the hypothetical possibility of
anti-publication rules may shed some useful light on the non-hypothetical
tradeoffs that anti-rulification rules actually present. Anti-publication rules
showcase in especially stark and crystallized terms the basic but important in-
sight that safeguarding a standard against subsequent rulification necessarily
means encroaching on the methodological discretion of lower-court actors.
That may well be a tradeoff worth making in a particular set of cases. But as I
hope this Article has helped to illustrate, it is at least a tradeoff worth taking
seriously.
CONCLUSION
Any system of adjudication must reconcile two basic tasks: resolving indi-
vidual disputes and enunciating legal norms. These two tasks, as many com-
mentators have noted, rest in uneasy repose. Efforts to ensure the fair and just
resolution of cases often come at the expense of promoting the sound devel-
opment of law, and vice versa. What is good for the parties to a particular dis-
pute may be bad for the doctrine writ large; what is good for the doctrine writ
large may be bad for the parties to a particular dispute. Many disagreements
over the judge's role boil down to this basic tradeoff: to what extent should
courts act as mere resolvers of disputes, and to what extent should they act as
active shapers of the law?199
198. See supra note 194.
19. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HA~v. L. REv. 1281
(1976) (contrasting the dispute resolution model with the norm articulation model, while
suggesting that the latter has become ascendant); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
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The questions examined in this Article implicate the tension between the
dispute resolution and law formulation models of judicial work. Those who
emphasize the dispute resolution model should find much to like in anti-
rulification rules, which help ensure comprehensive, holistic, and commonsen-
sical judicial deliberation about each case that makes its way through the legal
system. Those who favor the law declaration model, meanwhile, should find
much to dislike in anti-rulification rules, whose very attempts to realize fair-
ness at the retail level may frustrate courts' efforts to develop workable and ef-
fective doctrine at the wholesale level. This is so, we have seen, because prohib-
iting the rulification of standards means inhibiting beneficial forms of thinking
about and tinkering with the substance of the law itself. Additional complexi-
ties, to be sure, underlie this basic proposition. But the parallels nonetheless
strike me as important and real. Simply put, mandatory standards reflect the
values of the dispute resolver, whereas permissive standards reflect the values
of the law declarer.
The irony remains, though, that rules against rulification are rules-
reflecting, in other words, the law declarer's command that dispute resolution
matters most. This situation may seem inherently contradictory, though it
need not be so. If one believes that only the Supreme Court should function as
the exclusive developer of law within the judicial system, then it makes sense
for the Court to exert its law-developing authority in a manner that ensures fair
and faithful dispute resolution in the courts below. But insofar as one rejects
this vision of the federal judiciary- as I do - then rules against rulification are
not so easily justified. That is not to say that these rules have no place in a judi-
cial system in which all courts have some say over the scope and substance of
legal norms. But if the vision of our system is a collaborative one, in which the
Supreme Court leads but does not go it alone in developing the law, then the
Court should at least take care to promulgate its rules against rulification with
due attention to the law-declaration downsides that they bring.
L.J. 1073, 1O85 (1984) (opposing settlement practices, in part because they impede courts'
ability to "explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with
them"); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters,
112 COLUM. L. REv. 66S, 668-69 (2012) (noting that the "Court has in significant measure
embraced the premises of the law declaration model," as evidenced by its newfound exercise
of "wide-ranging agenda-setting freedom to determine what issues are to be (or not to be)
decided, irrespective of the wishes of the litigants").
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